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Plaintiff Google Inc. (“Google”), by and through its attorneys, hereby alleges: 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Google brings this action to prevent enforcement in the United States of a Canadian 
order that prohibits Google from publishing within the United States search result information 
about the contents of the internet.  As part of a Canadian lawsuit brought by Canadian plaintiffs 
against Canadian defendants, a Canadian trial court enjoined Google (a non-party based in 
California) from including in its search results links to dozens of the Canadian defendants’ 
websites—not just on Google’s www.google.ca site for Canada, but worldwide, including within 
the United States.  As a result, Google, alone among search engines and other providers of 
interactive computer services, is compelled to censor the information it provides to its users 
around the globe about the existence of the Canadian defendants’ websites.  
2. The Canadian trial court recognized that Google is an “innocent bystander” to the 
case.  Nevertheless, it issued a novel worldwide order against Google, restricting what information 
an American company can provide to people inside of the United States and around the world. 
Google appealed the order to the Court of Appeal and then the Supreme Court of Canada.  There, 
the Attorney General of Canada intervened to argue the order disregarded principles of 
territoriality and international comity to the detriment of Canadian law enforcement.  Although the 
Canadian plaintiffs acknowledged the risk that Canadian courts would misapply U.S. law, they 
urged that it was not an issue for the Canadian court to consider; it would be up to a U.S. court to 
clarify U.S. law. 
3. The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the global injunction against Google on 
June 28, 2017, dismissing Google’s concerns about the injunction violating U.S. law as 
“theoretical.”  The opinion recognizes that Google is an innocent non-party which cannot be held 
“liable” for any underlying competitive harm, but simultaneously justifies an unprecedented global 
injunction by characterizing Google—a single provider on interactive computer services—as “the 
determinative player in allowing the harm to occur.”  As of the June 28, 2017 decision, Google 
has exhausted its Canadian appeals.   
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4. Google now turns to this Court, asking it to declare that the rights established by 
the First Amendment and the Communications Decency Act are not merely theoretical.  The 
Canadian order is repugnant to those rights, and the order violates principles of international 
comity, particularly since the Canadian plaintiffs never established any violation of their rights 
under U.S. law.  Pursuant to well-established United States law, Google seeks a declaratory 
judgment that the Canadian court’s order cannot be enforced in the United States and an order 
enjoining that enforcement. 
PARTIES 
5. Plaintiff Google provides an internet search engine service.  Google is a subsidiary 
of Alphabet Inc., and is incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Mountain 
View, California.  
6. Upon information and belief, Defendant Equustek Solutions Inc. is a provider of 
industrial networking technology.  Defendant Equustek Solutions Inc. is incorporated in British 
Columbia, Canada with its principal place of business at 5489 Byrne Road Burnaby, British 
Columbia, V5J3J1, Canada.   
7. Upon information and belief, Defendant Clarma Enterprises Inc. is incorporated in 
British Columbia, Canada with its registered office at Box 12102, Suite 1008, 808 Nelson Street, 
Vancouver, British Columbia, V6Z2H2, Canada.  
8. Upon information and belief, Defendant Robert Angus is a professional engineer 
and principal of Defendants Equustek Solutions Inc. and Clarma Enterprises Inc., with a last 
known place of residence at 1838 W. 19th Avenue, Vancouver, British Columbia, V6J2N9, 
Canada. 
JURISDICTION & VENUE  
9. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this 
action arises under federal law, namely the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the 
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230.   
10. This Court is authorized to award the requested declaratory and injunctive relief 
under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02.  An “actual controversy” exists in the 
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Northern District of California regarding Google taking and continuing to take actions in the 
United States to comply with the delisting order the Defendants (collectively “Equustek”) 
obtained in Canada. 
11. This Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants because, inter alia, the 
Defendants have knowingly engaged in a course of conduct whereby they sought and obtained 
injunctive orders in the Equustek v. Jack litigation in Canada that are expressly aimed at requiring 
Google to undertake actions in the United States—specifically, to delist search results in the 
United States and throughout the world.  In November 2012 Equustek served Google with a 
Notice of Application to the British Columbia court at Google’s offices in Mountain View, 
California.  Equustek thereafter renewed the Application for a delisting injunction on May 13, 
2013; sought and obtained a trial court injunction on June 13, 2014; and maintained its position 
adverse to Google through the Canadian appellate process.  The Supreme Court of Canada 
confirmed in its June 28, 2017 opinion that the Canadian order was intended to require Google to 
take steps where its search engine is controlled—namely, California. 
12. A substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims alleged in this 
Complaint occurred in this Judicial District, specifically, Google’s delisting of search results 
pursuant to the Canadian court order.  Venue therefore lies in the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).   
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Google Offers Search Services Around The World. 
13. Google is an American company that offers a free and popular internet search 
engine, accessible at www.google.com.  Google’s United States and worldwide search engine 
operations are conducted from, and controlled by, Google’s headquarters in Mountain View, 
California.  Google also offers it search engine via more than a hundred different country-specific 
portals, such as www.google.mx and www.google.fr (targeted, respectively, to users in Mexico 
and France).  Google’s Canadian portal, www.google.ca, is offered in English and French. 
Google.ca has historically received approximately 95% of all Google searches originating from 
Canada.   
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14. Google’s search results are based on Google’s computers crawling, indexing, and 
algorithmically analyzing the trillions of webpages that make up the public internet.  The results of 
each individual search are returned automatically, but they are based on judgments Google has 
made, and subsequently programmed into Google’s ranking algorithms, about what material users 
are most likely to find responsive to their queries.  
15. Google is not the internet.  The vast majority of internet websites are hosted by and 
operated through service providers other than Google.  The entities with the technical ability to 
remove websites or content from the internet altogether are the websites’ owners, operators, 
registrars, and hosts—not Google.   
16. Removing a website link from the Google search index neither prevents public 
access to the website, nor removes the website from the internet at large.  Even if a website link 
does not show up in Google’s search results, anyone can still access a live website via other 
means, including by entering the website’s address in a web browser, finding the website through 
other search engines (such as Bing or Yahoo), or clicking on a link contained on a website (e.g., 
CNN.com), or in an email, social media post, or electronic advertisement.  
Equustek Sues Competitor Datalink In Canada. 
17. In 2011, in Vancouver, British Columbia, Equustek sued a group of individual and 
corporate defendants connected with a former distributor and rival business selling network 
interfacing hardware (collectively, “Datalink”).  The case is captioned Equustek Solutions Inc. v. 
Jack, Case No. S112421 (Sup. Ct. British Columbia).  Equustek alleged, inter alia, that Datalink 
had colluded with a former Equustek engineer to incorporate Equustek’s trade secret hardware 
designs and source code into a Datalink product, the GW1000; that Datalink sold the GW1000 
instead of Equustek products that customers thought they were ordering; and that Datalink made 
misleading statements about Equustek on its websites.   
18. The Canadian court initially denied the asset freeze Equustek sought.  But after 
Datalink refused to comply with court discovery orders and orders to remove references to 
Equustek from its website, and after Datalink stopped appearing in the litigation, Equustek 
procured multiple court orders against Datalink in the summer of 2012.  These included the 
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striking of Datalink’s response to Equustek’s initial pleading, an asset freeze, and a permanent 
injunction against Datalink continuing to sell the product at issue.  Datalink refused to comply, 
continued to operate its business, and fled the country.  Finding that the Datalink defendants may 
be in contempt of court, the Canadian court issued an arrest warrant in September 2012 for the 
primary individual defendant, but he has not yet been apprehended.  To this day, Datalink 
continues to offer the GW1000 for sale online.  
Equustek Obtains Canadian Injunction Prohibiting Google From Including Links To 
Datalink’s Websites In Search Results Displayed Anywhere In The World. 
19. In September 2012 Equustek asked Google to “cease indexing” Datalink’s websites 
in Google’s search results.  Pursuant to its policies, Google declined to do so at that time.  In 
December 2012, the Canadian court granted Equustek’s motion for a further injunction against 
Datalink, “prohibiting [Datalink] from carrying on business through any website.”  In light of that 
order, and pursuant to its policies, Google voluntarily blocked more than 300 individual webpage 
links associated with Datalink from appearing in Google’s Canadian search results on 
www.google.ca.  However, Google rejected Equustek’s demand that Google “delist” all links to 
Datalink’s websites on its search services targeted to users outside of Canada’s borders, including 
in the United States. 
20. Equustek then returned to court, seeking an order requiring Google to remove the 
webpage links from Google’s global search results.  On June 13, 2014, the Canadian trial court 
issued an unprecedented order, requiring that Google delist Datalink search results in every 
country Google search services are available, including in the United States.  The court recognized 
that Google was an “innocent bystander,” which “operates its search engines in the ordinary 
course of its business, independently of the [Datalink] defendants and not in order to assist them in 
their breach.”  Nevertheless, the court found that Google “is unwittingly facilitating the 
defendants’ ongoing breaches of this Court’s orders”  and concluded “[t]here is no other practical 
way for the defendants’ website sales to be stopped.”  The court did not cite any evidence in 
support of its finding, yet it “compell[ed] Google to block the defendants’ websites from Google’s 
search results world-wide.”  
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21. Google sought a stay of the June 2014 order pending its appeal, but that was 
denied.  Since then, Google has complied with the Canadian court’s order, delisting 33 Datalink 
websites from its search results globally, whether those results were being generated for users 
based in Australia or Zambia.  Because Datalink nonetheless continued to develop and operate 
other websites selling the GW1000, the trial court issued, at Datalink’s request, nine additional 
supplemental orders requiring Google to block more than 75 additional Datalink-associated 
webpages and websites.  Collectively, the June 2014 order and all supplements are referred to 
herein as the “Canadian Order.”  A true and correct copy of the June 13, 2014 order and the 
supplemental orders issued thus far are attached as Exhibit A.  Google has continued to comply 
with the Canadian Order. 
22. The Canadian Order has proven ineffective in preventing Datalink’s online 
operations.  Although the Canadian Order has been in effect for more than three years, many 
Datalink websites remain publicly available.  More than a third of the Datalink websites Google 
delisted are still active today.  It does not appear that Equustek has sought to enjoin the registrars 
or webhosts of Datalink’s  websites.  Unlike mere search delisting, registrars and webhosts have 
the power to remove the enjoined content from the internet. 
23. Equustek has only sought to enjoin Google’s search results; it has neither sought 
nor obtained similar orders mandating that other search engines delist the Datalink websites.   
Instead, searching for “GW1000” on Google’s competitors’ search engines shows that they are 
returning links to Datalink websites that Google was ordered to delist.   
Google Exhausts Its Appeals In Canada.  
24. Google promptly appealed the Canadian Order to the Court of Appeal for British 
Columbia, which affirmed the order on June 11, 2015.  The Court of Appeal for British Columbia 
held, among other things, that the Canadian Order did not “offend the sensibilities of any other 
nation.”   
25. Google further appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, which affirmed the order 
on June 28, 2017.  A true and correct copy of the June 28, 2017 Supreme Court of Canada order is 
attached as Exhibit B.  Applying a “balance of convenience” test, the Supreme Court of Canada 
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held that there is “no harm to Google which can be placed on its ‘inconvenience’ scale arising 
from the global reach of the order” mandating indefinite compliance because the “only obligation 
the interlocutory injunction creates is for Google to de-index the Datalink websites.”  The 
Supreme Court did not explain how its characterization of Google as the “determinative player in 
allowing the harm to occur” to Equustek was possible when, despite three years of Google’s 
compliance, Datalink websites are still live and in business, and can still be found through other 
search engines and internet sources. 
26. In a dissenting opinion, two Justices of the Supreme Court of Canada contended 
that the Canadian Order was improper, and the trial court should have exercised judicial restraint.  
They explained that “Google did not carry out the act prohibited by the December 2012 Order.”  
Nor has Google “aided or abetted Datalink’s wrongdoing; it holds no assets of Equustek’s, and has 
no information relevant to the underlying proceedings.”  Instead of simply preserving the status 
quo, “[t]he Google Order is mandatory and requires [ongoing] court supervision,” including 
through multiple supplemental orders.  Meanwhile, the Datalink websites are still live, and can 
still “be found using other search engines, links from other sites, bookmarks, email, social media, 
printed material, word-of-mouth, or other indirect means.  Datalink’s websites are open for 
business on the Internet whether Google searches list them or not.”  “The most that can be said is 
that the Google Order might reduce the harm to Equustek which Google is inadvertently 
facilitating.”  The dissent concluded that the Canadian Order therefore “has not been shown to be 
effective,” particularly where “Equustek has alternative remedies.” 
A Case Or Controversy Exists. 
27. With no further means of appeal of the Canadian Order, Google seeks relief from 
this United States Court.  The Canadian Order is an enforcement order, requiring Google to take 
actions in the United States to delist publicly available content from its search results in the United 
States.  Equustek expected that the United States would be the next venue in its battle.  Its counsel 
argued before the Supreme Court of Canada that the enforceability of the Canadian Order “in the 
United States is a question for U.S. courts and has nothing to do with this case,” and that after the 
Canadian court’s decision, “the American courts [can] then tell us what the law really is.”  
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28. Without a declaration from a United States court that enforcement of the Canadian 
Order in the U.S. is unlawful, Google believes that Equustek will continue to pursue enforcement 
of the Canadian Order and seek to hold Google in contempt if Google stops complying with it for 
search results displayed within the United States.   
29. Google now seeks a declaration from this Court that will protect its rights by 
enjoining enforcement of the Canadian Order in the United States.  This Court’s order will 
confirm that the rights established by the First Amendment and the Communications Decency Act 
are not merely “theoretical.” 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
U.S. CONST. Amend. I; Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 
(Against All Defendants) 
30. Google incorporates all of the above paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 
31. The First Amendment provides: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press.”  U.S. CONST. Amend. I.  Internet search results are fully 
protected speech under the First Amendment. 
32. The First Amendment’s prohibition on abridgments of speech extends to judicial 
restraints on free speech.  Because the Canadian Order is directed to a specific speaker—Google—
and is content-specific, it is subject to strict scrutiny. 
33. Enforcing the Canadian Order in the United States would violate the First 
Amendment.  The Canadian Order furthers no compelling interest (nor a substantial interest), and 
is not narrowly tailored to achieve one.  The existence of the Datalink websites is, and remains, a 
matter of public record.  Equustek cannot show that it has no alternatives available other than 
enjoining Google’s search results outside of Canada.  Upon information and belief, Equustek has 
not sought similar delisting injunctions against the world’s other search engines, such as Bing or 
Yahoo; has not taken action against other third-party websites (such as social media or press 
websites) displaying links to Datalink websites; has not pursued more targeted remedies against 
Datalink’s registrars or its webhosts, which could remove Datalink’s websites from the internet 
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entirely; and has not stopped the sale of Datalink’s products through Amazon.  Equustek did not 
even seek to seal the Datalink website addresses themselves before any court.  
34. On information and belief, if Defendants are not enjoined from enforcing the 
Canadian Order in the United States, Defendants will continue to use the Canadian Order to 
require Google to take action in the United States to delist search results in the United States and 
around the world.  
35. As the direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct, Google has suffered 
and, if Defendants’ conduct is not stopped, will continue to suffer, irreparable injury absent 
injunctive relief.  Although Google considers enforcement of the Canadian Order to be unlawful in 
the United States, it is presently complying with it in the United States until such time as this 
Court affords relief. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230; Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 
(Against All Defendants) 
36. Google incorporates all of the above paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 
37. The Communications Decency Act provides clear legal immunity to providers of 
interactive computer services for content on their services created by others:  “No provider or user 
of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  
38. The Communications Decency Act preempts law inconsistent with it, other than 
U.S. federal intellectual property law.  47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3); Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 
F. 3d 1102, 1107-08, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 2007).  Because Equustek’s action is grounded in 
Canadian trade secret law (not U.S. federal intellectual property law or trade secret laws), Section 
230 preempts Equustek’s attempted enforcement of the Canadian Order against Google in the 
United States.  
39. Google Search satisfies Section 230’s definition of an “interactive computer 
service” because it is an information service providing access to the Internet.  47 U.S.C. § 
230(f)(2).   
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40. Datalink, not Google, is the information content provider that supplies the content 
of its websites.  The fact that Google’s search results may contain snippets from third-party 
websites such as Datalink’s does not transform those snippets into content created by Google.   
41. Enforcement of the Canadian Order treats Google as if it were the publisher of the 
contents of the Datalink websites by enjoining Google’s display of accurate search results.  
Equustek’s enforcement of the Canadian Order boils down to forcing Google to exclude material 
that third parties have posted online. 
42. On information and belief, if Defendants are not enjoined from enforcing the 
Canadian Order in the United States, Defendants will continue to use the Canadian Order to 
require Google to delist search results in the United States.  
43. As the direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct, Google has suffered 
and, if Defendants’ conduct is not stopped, will continue to suffer, irreparable injury absent 
injunctive relief.  Although Google considers enforcement of the Canadian Order to be unlawful in 
the United States, it is presently complying with it in the United States until such time as this 
Court affords relief. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
Enforcement Trespasses on Comity; Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 
(Against All Defendants) 
44. Google incorporates all of the above paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.  
45. It is a foundational principle of jurisprudence that each country is the master of its 
own territory.  Foreign courts therefore ordinarily refrain from issuing worldwide injunctions 
because they only have jurisdiction to prescribe conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes 
place within or affects their own territories.    
46. Recognizing these principles, the Canadian Attorney General intervened in 
Google’s appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada and argued that the Canadian Order “constitutes 
an impermissible exercise of extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction.”   
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47.  Disregarding this, the Supreme Court of Canada declared “The Internet has no 
borders—its natural habitat is global” as a means to justify a global injunction.  But no one 
country should purport to control the global internet. 
48. Equustek’s counsel repeatedly acknowledged that United States courts might view 
the Canadian Order as violating United States law—but urged the Canadian courts to not reverse 
on that basis.  For example, Equustek’s counsel argued to the Supreme Court of Canada: “Whether 
the order might be enforceable in the United States is a question for US courts and has nothing to 
do with this case.”   
49. The Canadian Order is repugnant to United States public policy surrounding the 
First Amendment and the immunity against imposing liability on interactive computer service 
providers.  
50. The Canadian Order is further repugnant to United States public policy because it 
issued an injunction against Google, an innocent non-party, merely for the sake of “convenience.” 
The non-party injunction standard applied by the Supreme Court of Canada did not come close to 
satisfying well-settled United States law for imposing injunctions.  The Canadian standard only 
considers “the balance of convenience,” and not the “balance of equities,” and the Canadian court 
placed the burden on Google, a non-party, to disprove Equustek’s rights in every country outside 
of Canada, rather on Equustek, the plaintiff in the action, to prove its entitlement to removal of 
search results in each country in which it sought removal.  Moreover, the Canadian standard took 
no account of the “public interest” at all. 
51. As aptly summarized by the dissenting justices in the Supreme Court of Canada: 
Equustek “seek[s] a novel form of equitable relief―an effectively permanent injunction, against 
an innocent third party, that requires court supervision, has not been shown to be effective, and for 
which alternative remedies are available.” 
52. The Canadian Order purports to place the Canadian court in the position of 
supervising the law enforcement activities of a foreign sovereign nation (the United States) against 
the United States’ own citizens on American soil.  Because the Canadian courts ignored principles 
of international comity, corrective action by this Court is required.  This Court need not defer to 
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On information and belief, if Defendants are not enjoined from enforcing the 
Canadian Order in the United States, Defendants will continue to use the Canadian Order to 
require Google to delist search results in the United States.
As the direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct, Google has suffered 
and, if Defendants’ conduct is not stopped, will continue to suffer, irreparable injury absent 
injunctive relief.
3 53.
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6 54.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF9
WHEREFORE, Google respectfully requests the following relief:
Declare that the Canadian Order is unenforceable in the United States as 
inconsistent with the First Amendment, the Communications Decency Act, and the public policy 
surrounding enforceability of foreign judgments pursuant to international comity;
Issue judgment in Google’s favor and against Defendants on all causes of action
10
11 1.
12
13
14 2.
alleged herein;15
Grant Google preliminary and permanent injunctive relief enjoining enforcement of 
the Canadian Order in the United States;
Grant such other and further relief as the Court may deem to be just and proper.
16 3.
17
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I. INTRODUCTION  
[1] The plaintiffs apply for an interim injunction restraining two non-parties, 
Google Inc. and Google Canada Corporation, from including the defendants' 
websites in search results generated by Google's search engines. This application 
raises novel questions about the Court's authority to make such an order against a 
global internet service provider. 
[2] Although the plaintiffs seek an order against Google Inc. and Google Canada 
Corporation, there is no evidence that Google Canada Corporation is involved in the 
search services the plaintiffs seek to enjoin. It was common ground at the hearing 
that Google Inc. provides those internet search services. The order sought, if it is to 
be made, must thus be made against Google Inc. Accordingly, when I use the term 
"Google", I am referring only to Google Inc. I use the term "Google Canada" to refer 
to Google Canada Corporation in places. 
II. THE UNDERLYING ACTION  
[3] The plaintiffs manufacture networking devices that allow complex industrial 
equipment made by one manufacturer to communicate with complex industrial 
equipment made by another manufacturer. 
[4] The plaintiffs claim that the defendants other than Andrew Crawford and Lee 
Ingraham (hereinafter referred to as "the defendants"), while acting as a distributor of 
the plaintiffs' products, conspired with one of the plaintiffs' former engineering 
employees and others to design and manufacture a competing product, the 
GW1000. The plaintiffs say that the defendants designed their competing product 
using the plaintiffs' trade secrets. 
[5] The plaintiffs also claim that for many years before they made the GW1000 
the defendants covered over the plaintiffs' name and logo and passed off the 
plaintiffs' products as their own. Later when the defendants began manufacturing the 
GW1000, they relied on the plaintiffs' goodwill by exclusively advertising the 
plaintiffs' products on their websites. The defendants then delivered their own 
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competing product when they received orders for the plaintiffs' products, in a tactic 
amounting to "bait and switch". 
[6] This underlying action was commenced on April 12, 2011. The defendants 
failed to comply with various court orders from the outset of proceedings, resulting in 
the defences of Morgan Jack and Datalink Technologies Gateways Inc. being struck 
in June 2012. 
[7] The defendants originally carried on business in Vancouver but now appear 
to operate as a virtual company. They carry on business through a complex and 
ever expanding network of websites through which they advertise and sell their 
product. These websites have been the subject of numerous court orders, including 
a December 2012 order prohibiting the defendants from carrying on business 
through any website. The defendants continue to sell the GW1000 on their websites 
in violation of these court orders. 
[8] Google is not a party to this action. It operates and maintains intemet search 
services that include the defendants' various websites in Google's search results. 
Google acknowledges that it has the ability to remove websites from its search 
engine results, and routinely does so in various situations. 
[9] Following the December 2012 order prohibiting the defendants from carrying 
on business through any website, Google voluntarily complied with the plaintiffs' 
request to remove specific webpages or uniform resource locations ("URLs") from its 
Google.ca search results (i.e. from searches originating in Canada), removing 345 
URLs in total. However, Google is unwilling to block an entire category of URLs, 
sometimes referred to as "mother sites" from its search results worldwide. 
III. POSITION OF THE PARTIES TO THIS APPLICATION  
[10] The plaintiffs take the position that an injunction should be granted against 
Google because Google's search engine facilitates the defendants' ongoing breach 
of the Court's orders by leading customers to Datalink websites. 
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[11] Google takes the position that the Court does not have jurisdiction over either 
Google Inc. or Google Canada because neither is present in British Columbia and 
because the application for an injunction does not relate to Google doing or 
refraining from doing anything in either British Columbia or Canada. Google argues 
that even if this Court has jurisdiction, the order sought should not be made for two 
main reasons: (i) because it would amount to a worldwide order that could not be 
enforced and (ii) because it would constitute an unwarranted intrusion into Google's 
lawful business activities as a search engine. 
IV. ISSUES 
[12] The application raises three main issues: 
(i) Does this Court have territorial competence over a worldwide internet 
search provider such as Google? 
(ii) If the answer to the first question is yes, should this Court decline to 
exercise jurisdiction on the basis that California is the more appropriate 
forum? 
(iii) Should the order sought be granted? 
V. ANALYSIS  
1. Does the Court have territorial competence over Google? 
[13] Determining whether jurisdiction should be assumed in a case with 
interjurisdictional aspects has always been a complex question. The worldwide 
growth of intemet or e-commerce has only made the task more challenging. 
[14] The starting point in deciding whether the Court has territorial competence to 
make the order sought against Google is the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings 
Transfer Act, S.B.C. 2003, c. 28 [CJPTA] which codified and replaced the common 
law in this area. Territorial competence is established "by the existence of defined 
connections between the territory or legal system... and a party to the proceeding or 
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the facts on which the proceeding is based": Stanvtey v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals 
Inc., 2009 BCCA 592 at para. 10. 
[15] The plaintiffs accept they bear the burden of establishing the Court's territorial 
competence over Google. However, the parties do not agree on the standard of 
proof to be applied to this analysis. 
(i) What Standard of Proof applies? 
[16] The plaintiffs argue that they need only show a good arguable case that 
Google is within the Court's jurisdiction, sometimes described as a prima facie case. 
Google submits that the ordinary, higher standard of proof on a balance of 
probabilities applies. 
[17] The Court of Appeal held that a plaintiff need only establish an arguable case 
that a defendant is subject to the Court's jurisdiction: Purple Echo Productions, Inc. 
v. KCTS Television, 2008 BCCA 85 [Purple Echo] at paras. 41-42. That can be 
accomplished by asserting facts that, if proved, would found jurisdiction: Purple Echo 
at para. 36. However, this conclusion is predicated on the assumption that "[i]f an 
arguable case were made out, the case would continue with jurisdiction potentially 
still a live issue": Purple Echo at para. 37. The Court of Appeal noted that since a 
determination under what is now Rule 21-8(1) is not a final determination, a prima 
facie standard suffices: Purple Echo at para. 39. The standard of proof is thus clear 
when a defendant challenges jurisdiction. However, Google is not a defendant, but a 
non-party respondent on an interim application. 
[18] The order sought on this application is an interim one in the underlying action 
between the plaintiffs and defendants, and if ordered, may also turn out to be time-
limited against Google. However, if the order is made it is unlikely there will be 
another opportunity to consider the Court's jurisdiction to make an order against 
Google. In that sense the issue of territorial competence on this application is a final 
determination. 
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[19] On the other hand, the plaintiffs have had limited opportunity to gather 
evidence in support of the jurisdictional facts they rely on to establish the Court's 
territorial competence over Google. They have cross-examined Steven Smith, who 
is a member of the "Legal Removals" team in Google's legal department, but 
discovery of Google's corporate structure and operations has been limited. 
[20] The Supreme Court of Canada addressed the challenge facing a court in 
determining jurisdiction on interlocutory motions in Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 
2012 SCC 17, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572 [Van Breda] at para. 72: 
[72] ...[C]ourt decisions dealing with the assumption and the exercise of 
jurisdiction are usually interlocutory decisions made at the preliminary stages 
of litigation. These issues are typically raised before the trial begins. As a 
result, even though such decisions can often be of critical importance to the 
parties and to the further conduct of the litigation, they must be made on the 
basis of the pleadings, the affidavits of the parties and the documents in the 
record before the judge, which might include expert reports or opinions about 
the state of foreign law and the organization of and procedure in foreign 
courts. Issues of fact relevant to jurisdiction must be settled in this context, 
often on a prima facie basis. These constraints underline the delicate role of 
the motion judges who must consider these issues. 
[21] In my view, proof on a balance of probabilities is the appropriate standard on 
this application because the jurisdictional ruling is a final one vis a vis the applicant 
and respondent. However, that standard should be applied while recognizing that 
the plaintiffs have had a limited opportunity to marshal supporting evidence. 
(ii) Have the plaintiffs established territorial competence? 
[22] I return now to the substantive question: Does Google fall into one of the 
connecting factors specified in the CJPTA? Neither Google nor Google Canada is 
registered or has a place of business in British Columbia. Section 3(e) of the CJPTA 
provides that: 
3 A court has territorial competence in a proceeding that is brought 
against a person only if 
(e) there is a real and substantial connection between British 
Columbia and the facts on which the proceeding against that person 
is based. 
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[23] Section 10 of the CJPTA provides that "a real and substantial connection" 
between British Columbia and the facts on which the proceeding is based is 
presumed to exist if certain facts pertain. The plaintiffs rely on three of the 
connecting factors listed ins. 10, asserting that this application: 
(a) is brought to enforce, assert, declare or determine proprietary or 
possessory rights or a security interest in property in British Columbia that is 
immovable or movable property, 
(h) concerns a business carried on in British Columbia, 
(i) is a claim for an injunction ordering a party to do or refrain from doing 
anything 
(i) in British Columbia, or 
(ii) in relation to property in British Columbia that is immovable or 
movable property, 
[24] Before considering any of these connecting factors individually, I note that 
application of the presumptive factors in s. 10 of the CJPTA is contextual. The 
CJPTA, like many of the cases addressing conflicts of laws, focuses on parties to a 
dispute in which one has a cause of action against the other. However, proceeding 
is defined broadly in s. 1 of the CJPTA as "an action, suit, cause, matter, petition 
proceeding or requisition proceeding and includes a procedure and a preliminary 
motion". Thus, the "proceeding" with respect to which I must answer the question of 
jurisdiction is not the underlying dispute between the plaintiffs and defendants but 
the relief that is specifically sought against Google. 
[25] Turning to the connecting factors the plaintiffs rely on, I first conclude that 
s. 10(i) of the CJPTA is not applicable. The plaintiffs apply to compel Google to take 
steps to alter its search engine. While Google was vague about the location of the 
computers that operate the search engine program, it is certain that those computers 
are not located in British Columbia. It follows that the order sought does not relate to 
Google taking steps in British Columbia or in relation to property in British Columbia. 
[26] I conclude that s. 10(a) of the CJPTA is applicable. This connecting factor 
establishes a presumptive substantial connection in a proceeding brought to enforce 
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proprietary rights over immoveable or moveable property in British Columbia. The 
plaintiffs' intellectual property at the heart of the underlying action is moveable 
property. The plaintiffs seek to enjoin Google in order to enforce their proprietary 
rights. 
[27] The plaintiffs acknowledge that the vast majority of GW1000 sales occur 
outside of Canada, but I accept that at least to the extent that the order sought 
relates to the enforcement of intellectual property rights in British Columbia, s. 10(a) 
applies. It may be a weak connecting factor, but that is not a consideration at this 
stage of the jurisdictional analysis. 
[28] I conclude that s. 10(h) is also a connecting factor, and a stronger one, 
because the injunction sought concerns a business that Google carries on in British 
Columbia. The question of whether Google carries on business in British Columbia 
requires a detailed consideration of Google's operations. 
[29] Google Canada is a wholly owned subsidiary of Google. It is chiefly 
responsible for marketing Google's services, including its search advertising, 
engineering efforts on products other than Google search, and other forms of 
interaction with the Canadian public such as policy outreach. Google Canada is 
incorporated in Nova Scotia and has offices in Montreal, Toronto, Ottawa, and 
Waterloo. Google Canada is not extra-provincially registered in British Columbia. 
[30] Google is a publically traded company incorporated in Delaware, USA. Its 
head office is in Mountain View, California and its intemet search services are 
"operated out of that facility". It too is not extra-provincially registered in British 
Columbia. Google has two wholly owned subsidiaries that are extra-provincially 
registered in British Columbia, Google Payment Corp. and Google Canada Payment 
Corp., but I have no evidence about the activities of those companies. 
[31] Google operates the Google search engine that makes internet search results 
available through dedicated websites for each country around the world. For 
example, Google provides internet search services to users in Canada through 
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"www.google.ca", to users in the United States through "www.google.com", and to 
users in France through "www.google.fr". Despite providing country specific search 
websites, Google acknowledges that intemet users are not restricted to using the 
website dedicated to their particular country. Thus users in Canada can search 
through "www.google.fr", and vice versa. 
[32] There are hundreds of millions of active websites over the intemet and 
trillions of webpages. Search engines make the internet a viable and effective 
information and communication resource. The intemet cannot be successfully 
navigated without search services such as those Google provides. Although there 
are other intemet search companies, 70-75% of intemet searches worldwide are 
done through Google. 
[33] Google does not charge for providing internet search services. It earns money 
in other ways, primarily by selling advertising space on the webpages that display 
search results. Google's advertising success is driven by the very high quality of its 
search results. Its income from these commercial activities is about $50 billion 
annually. 
[34] Google says that the fact that an intemet search is initiated in British 
Columbia does not equate to Google carrying on business in the province. Google 
argues that on the plaintiffs' reasoning there is not a country on earth whose civil 
courts could not assert jurisdiction over Google in respect of search results. Rather, 
suggests Google, "some form of actual not virtual presence is required". Google 
relies heavily on Van Breda in which LeBel J. wrote at para. 87: 
[87] Carrying on business in the jurisdiction may also be considered an 
appropriate connecting factor. But considering it to be one may raise more 
difficult issues. Resolving those issues may require some caution in order to 
avoid creating what would amount to forms of universal jurisdiction in respect 
of tort claims arising out of certain categories of business or commercial 
activity. Active advertising in the jurisdiction or, for example, the fact that a 
Web site can be accessed from the jurisdiction would not suffice to establish 
that the defendant is carrying on business there. The notion of carrying on  
business requires some form of actual, not only virtual, presence in the  
jurisdiction, such as maintaining an office there or regularly visiting the  
territory of the particular jurisdiction. [Emphasis added.] 
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Google did not quote that paragraph in full. The next line adds what is, in my view, 
an important qualification: 
But the Court has not been asked in this appeal to decide whether and, if so, 
when e-trade in the jurisdiction would amount to a presence in the 
jurisdiction. 
In contrast to Van Breda, the matter before me involves e-commerce, or at least 
providing an "e-service". 
[35] Van Breda indicates that a real and substantial connection cannot be derived 
from the mere fact that a passive website can be accessed in the jurisdiction. To 
similar effect is Thumbnail Creative Group Inc. v. Blu Concept Inc., 2009 BCSC 
1833 [Thumbnail]. In that case the plaintiff claimed the defendant breached copyright 
by publishing the plaintiffs images. The defendant published these images in a book 
in the United States which could be purchased on the internet. Madam Justice 
Dickson said at para 19: 
[19] ... use of the Internet in the course of conducting business does not  
mean the business in question is carried on globally for the purposes of a  
territorial competence analysis. As counsel for [the defendants] points out, if 
this were so the Supreme Court of British Columbia would have jurisdiction in 
any dispute involving any business that makes long-distance telephone calls 
into this province or relies upon the Internet. [The plaintiff] did not provide 
authority in support of this far reaching proposition, which is, in my view, 
unsustainable. [Emphasis added.] 
[36] It follows form Van Breda and Thumbnailthat the ability of someone in British 
Columbia to open a website created by a person in another country does not of itself 
give this Court jurisdiction over the creator of that website. Something more is 
required. In Van Breda, the Court considered factors such as whether the 
defendants' representatives regularly travelled to Ontario to further the defendants' 
promotional activities for its resorts and whether it distributed promotional materials 
in the province. In Thumbnail, Dickson J. considered that the connection between 
the defendants and British Columbia appeared to be limited to the sale of one copy 
of the defendant's book. 
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[37] E-commerce has exponentially increased the difficulty of determining whether 
a company is carrying on business in a particular jurisdiction; it raises the spectre of 
a company being found to carry on business all over the world, just as Google 
submits with some alarm. Kevin Meehan comments in "The Continuing Conundrum 
of International Internet Jurisdiction" (2008) 31 BC Int'l & Comp L Rev 345 at 349: 
In the traditional analog world, it is relatively easy for courts to determine the 
geographical locations of the persons, objects, and activities relevant to a 
particular case. The geography of the digital world of the Internet, however, is 
not as easily charted. Content providers may physically reside, conduct their 
business, and locate their servers in a particular location, yet their content is 
readily accessible from anywhere in the world. Furthermore, attempts to 
identify the location of a particular user over the Internet have proven 
extremely difficult, and many Internet users compound this problem by 
intentionally hiding their location. Traditional principles of international 
jurisdiction, particularly territoriality, are poorly suited for this sort of 
environment of geographic anonymity. Courts have struggled to develop a 
satisfactory solution, yet no progress has been made toward a uniform global 
standard of Internet jurisdiction. 
[38] In short, courts have traditionally focused on locating the behaviour in issue 
within a particular state's borders to ensure that "the connection between a state and 
a dispute cannot be weak or hypothetical [so as to] cast doubt upon the legitimacy of 
the exercise of state power over the persons affected by the dispute" [Van Breda at 
para. 32]. Online activities, whether commercial or otherwise, are not so easily 
pigeonholed. 
[39] In Barrick Gold Corp. v. Lopehandia (2004), 71 O.R. (3d) 416, 2004 CanLII 
12938 (C.A.) [Barrick Gold], an Ontario company sued a British Columbia resident, 
alleging that he was defaming the company by posting hundreds of messages on 
internet websites accusing the company of fraud, tax evasion, money laundering, 
and genocide. At para. 30 the Ontario Court of Appeal quoted with approval from a 
High Court of Australia decision that said: 
The Internet is essentially a decentralized, self-maintained 
telecommunications network. It is made up of inter-linking small networks 
from all parts of the world. It is ubiquitous, borderless, global and ambient in 
its nature. Hence the term "cyberspace" This is a word that recognizes that 
the interrelationships created by the Internet exist outside conventional 
geographic boundaries and comprise a single interconnected body of data, 
potentially amounting to a single body of knowledge. The Internet is 
20
14
 B
C
SC
 1
06
3 
(C
an
LI
I)  
 
 
r   ex t l  in r s d th  di ficul f t r i
i  rr i  rti j i ; it i  
i f r l , t 
  eh n co ents in “  Contin i onu
ternational Internet Jurisdiction” (20 8) 31 BC Int’l & Co p L Rev 34  
 l  i ly t  
 t  tie   
l r t  , 
i  o t t y l
t i  i  rti l ti t
 i
ify i  f  ic lar r  ter et 
l lt, r   
i lly  i ri i i
, i l l  t it riality, r  
 i  t .    
l tion, yet  rogress has    i
j i i  
 , ts  lly      
i  lar t t ’   t  re  “the ection t e  
t  r i l t    
r r t r ff y t dis ”
]. nl acti  r ise, il
 
 ( , 4 an I
 riti l i
  f i t dreds  
t   l
 t  t our f l i   
i  
 ti  l i
i ti   i li l
 l it s, l l i
 . hi  i   t r
i s I t t i t t i ti
i i
l  i I
20
14
 B
CS
C 
10
63
 (C
an
LII
)
- 11 -Case 5:17-cv-04207   Document 1   Filed 07/24/17   Page 25 of 143
- 12 - 
Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack Page 12 
accessible in virtually all places on Earth where access can be obtained 
either by wire connection or by wireless (including satellite) links. Effectively, 
the only constraint on access to the Internet is possession of the means of 
securing connection to a telecommunications system and possession of the 
basic hardware. [Italics added by the Ontario Court of Appeal.] 
[40] The Ontario Court of Appeal went on to note that these characteristics create 
a challenge in the defamation context and that "Traditional approaches ... may not 
respond adequately to the realities of the Internet world": Barrick Gold at para. 32. 
[41] Canadian courts have found some assistance regarding jurisdiction and the 
internet in American cases. As academic commentators note, American 
jurisprudence is "an imperfect fit, as the American approach to personal jurisdiction 
has its roots in that country's constitutional requirement for minimal contact in order 
to establish due process.": Teresa Scassa & Michael Deturbide, Electronic 
Commerce and Internet Law in Canada, 2nd ed (Toronto, Ontario: CCH Canadian 
Limited, 2012) at 602 [Scassa & Deturbide]. 
[42] Canadian courts have widely considered the United States District Court 
decision in Zippo Manufacturing v. Zippo Dot Com Inc., 952 F Supp 119 (WD Pa 
1997) [Zippo]: Braintech, Inc. v. Kostiuk, 1999 BCCA 169 [Braintech], Pro-C Ltd. v. 
Computer City Inc., [2000] O.J. No. 2823 (S.C.J.), Wiebe v. Bouchard et al., 2005 
BCSC 47. 
[43] The plaintiff in Zippo is a Pennsylvania corporation that manufactures Zippo 
lighters. It claimed that the defendant, a California corporation that operated an 
internet news service and website under the domain names "ZippoNews.com", 
"Zippo.com" and "Zippo.net", infringed its trademark. The defendant's officers, 
employees, and internet servers were located in California and it had no offices, 
employees, or agents in Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania residents accessed the 
defendant's website, signed up, and received a news message service. Three 
thousand of the defendant's 140,000 subscribers world-wide were Pennsylvania 
residents. Contracts between users in Pennsylvania and the defendant were entered 
into on the website. 
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[44] The issue was whether Pennsylvanian's long-arm statute could "reach" the 
defendant in California and exercise personal jurisdiction over it. As in Van Breda 
and Thumbnail, the Court concluded that being able to access a passive website 
was an insufficient basis for the state where the website was accessed to assert 
jurisdiction. 
[45] However, the Court found it had jurisdiction because the defendant had 
subjected itself to Pennsylvania's jurisdiction by conducting electronic commerce in 
Pennsylvania through its interactive website. 
[46] In Scassa & Deturbide at 604, the authors note that in the years since Zippo, 
American courts began to feel uncomfortable with the vague "interactivity" concept of 
Zippo and moved towards a test that focussed on "targeting" a jurisdiction, which fit 
more easily in areas like defamation where the Zippo test was particularly 
inadequate. The concepts of interactivity and targeting are of assistance in 
assessing whether Google carries on business in British Columbia through its 
websites. 
[47] Google submits that it merely offers a passive website to residents of British 
Columbia who wish to search the internet. It argues that its programs automatically 
generate search results without Google being actively involved in the particular 
search. Paragraph 23 of Google's written submissions state: 
[23] ... Google's internet search engine allows users to enter key-words 
and then Google generates a list of results in a specific ranked order. 
Google's search results are computer generated through the use of Google's 
highly confidential and proprietary algorithm and methodology. Google's web 
crawler program (referred to as "Googlebot") reviews the content that is 
available on trillions of webpages or URLs over the internet. Search results 
are generated based on that content [within seconds]. 
[48] I conclude that Google's internet search websites are not passive information 
sites. As a user begins to type a few letters or a word of their query, Google 
anticipates the request and offers a menu of suggested potential search queries. 
Those offerings are based on that particular user's previous searches as well as the 
phrases or keywords most commonly queried by all users. As James Grimmelman 
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writes in "The Structure of Search Engine Law" (2007-2008) 93 Iowa L Rev 1 at 10-
11. 
Search engines are also increasingly learning from the large volumes of 
query data they have accumulated. A user's history of queries can provide 
useful information about her probable intentions -- for example, whether she 
tends towards navigational or transactional queries. Similarly, search engines 
gain useful feedback into their own successes and failures by seeing which 
results users click on or by noticing long strings of searches on related terms, 
which may indicate that the user is having trouble finding what she's looking 
for. 
[49] Google collects a wide range of information as a user searches, including the 
user's IP address, location, search terms, and whether the user acts on the search 
results offered by "clicking through" to the websites on the list. 
[50] In addition to its search services, Google sells advertising to British Columbia 
clients. Indeed, Google entered into an advertising contract with the defendants and 
advertised their products up to the hearing of this application. Google acknowledges 
it should not advertise for the defendants and filed an affidavit explaining its 
inadvertent failure to suspend the defendants' Google account prior to the hearing. 
[51] Although Google's advertising business is marketed in Canada by Google 
Canada, British Columbia residents who wish to advertise on Google's webpages 
contract directly with Google and make payments directly to Google. Although those 
contracts stipulate that disputes will be governed by California law and adjudicated 
in California courts, the "choice of laws" provision in those contracts does not alter 
the fact that Google is carrying on a business in this province through advertising 
contracts with British Columbia residents. 
[52] The Supreme Court of Canada noted that advertising in a jurisdiction is not by 
itself a sufficient connection to establish territorial competence: Van Breda at 
paras. 87, 114. But there is a difference between a company advertising its own 
services through a website or other media available to British Columbia residents, 
and engaging in the business of selling advertising space on the internet to other 
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companies in British Columbia. There is uncontradicted evidence before me that 
Google sells advertising to British Columbia residents, including the defendants. 
[53] Google submits that its advertising services are completely separate from its 
search services, and cannot justify the Court assuming jurisdiction over Google's 
search services. With respect, I do not agree with that proposition for two reasons. 
[54] First, Google's business model is contextual advertising; the "context" is the 
search done using Google's search services. Ads are linked to either the subject 
matter of the search, or the history of the person searching. Google does not charge 
users of its search services. Rather, it sells space on its websites to advertisers 
whose ads are displayed alongside the search results generated by a user's query. 
[55] These ads can relate to the topics searched. For example, if "Vancouver 
lawyers" is searched, a page showing a list of Vancouver lawyers will be generated. 
At the top of the list a number of ads show up for law firms that have paid Google in 
order to advertise there. Those ads look like the other search results but are marked 
by . 
[56] These ads can also be unrelated to the content of the search, but geared to a 
particular searcher. For example, if the user has in the past searched a retail 
website, ads for that retail outlet may appear on the page showing the search results 
for the query "Vancouver lawyers". Google can individually tailor the advertising 
seen by a user each time they search using the information in the search query and 
that user's own search history. 
[57] Google made the same argument that its ad and search services are 
unrelated in submissions to the European Court of Justice in Google Spain SL and 
Google Inc. v. Agencia Espanola de ProtecciOn de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja 
Gonzalez, C-131/12 [Gonzalez]. The European Court of Justice delivered judgment 
on 13 May 2014. Its reasons are available online but are not yet published. In that 
dispute, Mr. Gonzalez lodged a complaint with the Spanish Data Protection Agency 
based on the fact that when an intemet user entered Mr. Gonzalez's name in the 
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Google search engine, the user would obtain links to two pages of a newspaper 
published in January and March of 1998 relating to attachment proceedings against 
Mr. Gonzalez for the recovery of social service debts. 
[58] Mr. Gonzalez applied to order the newspaper to remove or alter its webpages 
so that his personal data no longer appeared. He also requested that Google Spain 
or Google be required to remove or conceal his personal data so that it was not 
included in search results given that the attachment proceedings concerning him 
had been fully resolved for a number of years and any "reference to them was now 
entirely irrelevant" (para. 15). 
[59] The Spanish Data Protection Agency upheld Mr. Gonzalez's complaint 
against Google Spain and Google on the basis that search engine operators were 
subject to data protection legislation. Google appealed that decision to the National 
High Court which in turn referred the matter to the European Court of Justice for 
preliminary rulings. The European Court of Justice confirmed that the promotion and 
sale of advertising space in relation to Spain constituted the bulk of Google's 
commercial activity and was "regarded as closely linked to Google Search" 
(para. 46). The European Court of Justice concluded at para. 56: 
[56] ... the activities of the operator of the search engine [Google] and 
those of its establishment situated in the Member State [Google Spain] 
concerned are inextricably linked since the activities relating to the 
advertising space constitute the means of rendering the search engine at 
issue economically profitable and that engine is, at the same time, the means 
enabling those activities to be performed. 
[60] While Gonzalez concerned the protection of personal information and 
particular statutory provisions, the analysis relating to the connection between 
Google's advertising and search functions is of assistance. I too conclude that the 
two parts of Google's business are inextricably linked; neither service can stand 
alone. 
[61] Second, whether the advertising activity conducted in British Columbia is the 
same as the activity which the plaintiff seeks to enjoin is not germane to the 
territorial competence analysis. The difference between the advertising business and 
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the search business to be enjoined goes to the strength of the connection between 
the matter and British Columbia. It could thus be a factor when assessing whether 
British Columbia is the appropriate forum, but it does not affect this court's territorial 
competence. Once the Court has in personam jurisdiction, it has it for all purposes. 
[62] Further, at the territorial competence stage of the analysis, the Court is not 
looking for the strongest possible connection to this forum, but for a connection 
sufficient to meet the requirements of the CJPTA. In Purple Echo the plaintiff 
claimed damages for alleged breaches of a co-production agreement with 
broadcaster KCTS which was licenced to broadcast only in the United States, 
although broadcasts were available to viewers in Canada. KCTS was found to have 
a place of business in British Columbia because PCPTA, a federally incorporated 
Canadian corporation with an office in Vancouver, solicited Canadian donations for 
KCTS under contract and paid the money to KCTS: Purple Echo at paras. 44-46. 
The Court of Appeal's finding that British Columbia had territorial competence turned 
on a number of other factors as well, but the Court nonetheless included the link 
between the "parent" and its agent company as a factor supporting the connection 
between that parent company and British Columbia. 
[63] In any event, I find that Google's search and advertising services are 
inextricably linked. 
[64] I will address here Google's submission that this analysis would give every 
state in the world jurisdiction over Google's search services. That may be so. But if 
so, it flows as a natural consequence of Google doing business on a global scale, 
not from a flaw in the territorial competence analysis. As Janet Walker writes in 
Castel & Walker: Canadian Conflict of Laws, loose-leaf, 6 ed (Markham, Ontario: 
LexisNexis, 2005), ch 11 at 27, a legal person such as a corporation can be subject 
to multiple jurisdictions whether because it is resident there through registration, or 
because it is carrying on business in that jurisdiction. Further, the territorial 
competence analysis would not give every state unlimited jurisdiction over Google; 
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jurisdiction will be confined to issues closely associated with the forum in 
accordance with private international law. 
[65] In summary on this issue, I conclude that the Court has territorial competence 
over Google on this application. 
2. Is British Columbia the appropriate forum? 
[66] Should the Court decline to exercise its jurisdiction on the basis that there is 
another, more convenient forum in which to adjudicate this application? As the 
Supreme Court of Canada observed in Van Breda at para. 101, a clear distinction 
must be drawn between the existence and the exercise of jurisdiction. The former is 
concerned generally with preventing jurisdictional overreach and respecting the 
authority of foreign courts, the latter is concerned with fairness to the parties and 
efficient resolution of the dispute: Van Breda at paras. 22, 104-105. Although 
Google did not frame its argument expressly in terms of forum non conveniens, it 
asserted that California is a better forum to hear this application. Therefore, the 
issue must be addressed. 
[67] Once jurisdiction is established, the burden falls on Google to show why the 
Court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction and displace the forum chosen by the 
plaintiffs: Van Breda at para. 103. Google must show that the alternative forum is 
clearly more appropriate and that, in light of the characteristics of the alternative 
forum, the matter can be adjudicated more fairly and efficiently there. 
[68] In British Columbia the Court's discretion to stay the proceeding in favour of 
another state's jurisdiction is grounded ins. 11(1) of the CJPTA: 
11 (1) After considering the interests of the parties to a proceeding and the 
ends of justice, a court may decline to exercise its territorial competence in 
the proceeding on the ground that a court of another state is a more 
appropriate forum in which to hear the proceeding. 
[69] Google's submissions in support of a stay can be grouped into three main 
arguments: 
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(i) The Court should decline jurisdiction because Google has agreed to 
block specific websites from its search results and the plaintiffs have 
failed to avail themselves of that out-of-court remedy; 
(ii) Google has a stronger connection to California; and 
(iii) An order made by a California court can be enforced. 
I will deal with each submission in turn. 
(i) Is an out-of-court remedy available to the plaintiffs? 
[70] Google submits that the plaintiffs have a remedy available to them without a 
court order but have failed to avail themselves of it. Although this is not strictly 
speaking another forum, it is convenient to address the question here. After Google 
received notice of this Court's orders in the fall of 2012 and the plaintiffs filed this 
application, Google agreed to take down the defendants' websites that the plaintiffs 
identified by way of a specific URL. 
[71] The plaintiffs initially agreed to try that route and adjourned the application 
generally to do so. They provided Google with specific URLs from which the 
defendants were selling the GW1000 in violation of the Court's orders. Google 
voluntarily blocked 345 websites from its search results. This is referred to as "taking 
down" websites. 
[72] However, the process was wholly unsatisfactory from the plaintiffs' 
perspective. In place of the de-indexed websites, a whole host of new websites 
moved up the rankings to take their place. Websites can be generated automatically, 
resulting in an endless game of "whac-a-mole" with the plaintiffs identifying new 
URLs and Google deleting them. The plaintiffs argue that any scheme that depends 
on the deletion of individual URLs is ineffective. 
[73] The insufficiency of the voluntary take-down of specific websites was 
recognized by the Regional Court of Paris in the unreported decision Trib gr inst 
Pads, 6 November 2013, Max Mosely v. Google France SARL and Google Inc.[Max 
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Mosely]. Mosely had been surreptitiously videotaped by the News of the World while 
engaging in sexual activity with several partners. The newspaper published the 
images and made others available on its website. In a French criminal proceeding, 
the newspaper was found guilty and ordered to cease publishing the images. 
However, the images remained widely available by searching through Google 
Images. 
[74] Mosely asked Google to stop indexing the pictures with reference to specific 
URLs. He made many such requests and Google honoured all of the requests but 
the images continued to be indexed through new URLs. After two years of this 
process, Mosely asked Google to prevent the images from being indexed at all. 
Google refused and Mosely applied for an injunction and damages. The Court 
observed that it was impossible for the plaintiff to have his right enforced by using 
only the procedures made available by Google (English translation of Max Moselyat 
10). 
[75] The inadequacy of this approach in the present matter is heightened by 
Google's removal of specific URLs from only those searches initiated through 
Google.ca — a fact that came to the plaintiffs' attention only after cross-examining 
Mr. Smith on his affidavit on May 21, 2013. As a result, the defendants' blocked 
websites appear when searches are conducted from any country other than Canada, 
or when a search is conducted within Canada using a Google website other than 
www.google.ca. 
[76] The majority of GW1000 sales occur outside Canada. Thus, quite apart from 
the practical problem of endless website iterations, the option Google proposes is 
not equivalent to the order now sought which would compel Google to remove the 
defendants' websites from all search results generated by any of Google's websites 
worldwide. I therefore conclude that the plaintiffs do not have an out of court remedy 
available to them. 
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(ii) Does Google have a stronger connection to California? 
[77] Google is a Delaware company that is registered and has its head office in 
California. The CJPTA, like the common law it codified, recognizes that the ordinary 
residence of a person within a state is a strong connecting factor justifying the 
assumption of jurisdiction over that person. Residence for a legal person such as a 
corporation is established under s. 7 of the CJPTA only if: 
(a) the corporation has or is required by law to have a registered office 
in British Columbia, 
(b) pursuant to law, it 
(i) has registered an address in British Columbia at which 
process may be served generally, or 
(ii) has nominated an agent in British Columbia upon whom 
process may be served generally, 
(c) it has a place of business in British Columbia, or 
(d) its central management is exercised in British Columbia. 
[78] None of these subsections apply to Google in British Columbia, but all pertain 
in California. Google's intemet search services are said to "operate out of its head 
office. 
[79] I accept that Google has a strong presence in and connection to California. 
But the question is "which forum is more appropriate?" not "where does Google 
reside?" As the Supreme Court of Canada observed in Van Breda at para. 109, the 
Court should not exercise its discretion in favour of a stay solely because it finds that 
comparable forums exist in other states: 
[109] ... It is not a matter of flipping a coin. A court hearing an application 
for a stay of proceedings must find that a forum exists that is in a better 
position to dispose fairly and efficiently of the litigation. But the court must be 
mindful that jurisdiction may sometimes be established on a rather low 
threshold under the conflicts rules. Forum non conveniens may play an 
important role in identifying a forum that is clearly more appropriate for 
disposing of the litigation and thus ensuring fairness to the parties and a more 
efficient process for resolving their dispute. 
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[80] The factors I must consider in deciding whether California is the more 
appropriate forum in which to hear this application include those set out in s. 11(2) of 
the CJPTA: 
11 (2) A court, in deciding the question of whether it or a court outside British 
Columbia is the more appropriate forum in which to hear a proceeding, must 
consider the circumstances relevant to the proceeding, including 
(a) the comparative convenience and expense for the parties to the 
proceeding and for their witnesses, in litigating in the court or in any 
alternative forum, 
(b) the law to be applied to issues in the proceeding, 
(c) the desirability of avoiding multiplicity of legal proceedings, 
(d) the desirability of avoiding conflicting decisions in different courts, 
(e) the enforcement of an eventual judgment, and 
(f) the fair and efficient working of the Canadian legal system as a 
whole. 
[81] I will address each of these factors in turn. 
(a) Comparative convenience and expense 
[82] This factor is of limited significance since "the proceeding" in this case is a 
single application for an interim injunction. Google has already incurred the expense 
of argument and appearance here. I consider it nonetheless because it could still be 
a factor with respect to enforcement if I grant the order sought. 
[83] This factor encompasses the Court's concern for protecting the respondent 
from unfairly inconvenient litigation. Google is a highly sophisticated entity with 
annual revenues of $50 billion and 54,000 employees worldwide. Because of the 
emergent nature of its business, Google often finds itself at the cutting edge of legal 
issues in many different fields of law all over the world, including in the areas of 
defamation, copyright, privacy and competition law. As a result Google has an in-
house legal department of 700 people, including dedicated product counsel, national 
and regional counsel, and litigation counsel. 
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[84] In contrast, the primary corporate plaintiff is a small British Columbia 
company which is incurring significant financial losses due to the defendants' 
conduct. I find this factor favours British Columbia as the more appropriate forum. 
(b) The law to be applied to issues in the proceeding 
[85] This is a neutral factor; in either forum local law would apply. Google 
acknowledges that theft of intellectual property rights would be actionable in 
California, but I have no evidence before me of the applicable law in California 
governing the granting of injunctions against non-parties. 
(c) The desirability of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings 
[86] The plaintiffs' application for an interim injunction against Google is founded 
on the plaintiffs' actions against the defendants and the Court's inherent jurisdiction 
to issue orders to protect the integrity of its own process, as recognized in s. 39(1) of 
the Law and Equity Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 253. The plaintiffs seek the injunction to 
prevent the defendants from continued and flagrant breaches of this Court's orders 
in the underlying action. 
[87] Setting aside for the moment the question of whether this application could be 
made in California without the underlying action to support it, it would at a minimum 
require the plaintiffs to commence a second proceeding in California. This factor 
therefore favours British Columbia. 
(d) The desirability of avoiding conflicting decisions in 
different courts. 
[88] This factor is of little assistance on this application as there is a single issue, 
whether the injunction should be granted, which is unlikely to be considered in both 
courts. 
(e) Fair and efficient working of the Canadian legal system 
[89] This factor is of little assistance on the application before me. 
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(f) The enforcement of an eventual judgment 
[90] This is the main ground upon which Google asserts that California is the more 
appropriate forum. How, Google asks, can this Court force Google to take steps 
outside of British Columbia? 
[91] Google raises a good point. Traditionally, courts have not granted injunctive 
relief against defendants who reside outside the jurisdiction. In Barrick Gold at 
para. 74, the Ontario Court of Appeal explained this general rule by quoting from 
Robert J. Sharpe's text Injunctions and Specific Performance: 
Claims for injunctions against foreign parties present jurisdictional constraints  
which are not encountered in the case of claims for money judgments. In the 
case of a money claim, the courts need not limit assumed jurisdiction to 
cases where enforceability is ensured. Equity, however, acts in personam  
and the effectiveness of an equitable decree depends upon the control which  
may be exercised over the person of the defendant. If the defendant is 
physically present, it will be possible to require him or her to do, or permit, 
acts outside the jurisdiction. The courts have, however, conscientiously 
avoided making orders which cannot be enforced. The result is that the 
courts are reluctant to grant injunctions against parties not within the 
jurisdiction and the practical import of rules permitting service ex juris in 
respect of injunction claims is necessarily limited. Rules of court are typically 
limited to cases where it is sought to restrain the defendant from doing 
anything within the jurisdiction. As a practical matter the defendant "who is 
doing anything within the jurisdiction" will usually be physically present within 
the jurisdiction to allow ordinary service. [Italics in original; underlining 
added.] 
[92] On this basis the Court of Appeal in United Services Funds (Trustees of) v. 
Richardson Greenshields of Canada Ltd. (1988), 23 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1, 1988 CanLII 
2960 (C.A.) held that a court should not grant an order compelling an out-of-country 
individual to attend for examination for discovery. 
[93] However, there are exceptions to the general rule. For example, in Barrick 
Gold the Ontario Court of Appeal granted a permanent injunction against a British 
Columbia resident in a defamation proceeding. 
[94] An injunction is an equitable remedy and is enforced through the courts' 
contempt power. Generally, that power is exercised through fines and imprisonment. 
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These penalties are more easily invoked when a person resides within the court's 
jurisdiction so that either the person or his assets can be "seized". 
[95] But these are not the only remedies available to the Court. In Bea v. The 
Ovviers, Strata Plan LMS2138, 2014 BCSC 826, Grauer J. cites with approval the 
following words of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and 
Labrador: 
The law of contempt is found in the development of the common law. That 
law is always evolving. The state of its development is not frozen at any 
particular date in judicial history. So also, with respect to the types of penalty 
which a court may employ to vindicate its contempt power. Differing penalties 
may be creatively employed, either singly or in combination, in new situations 
to achieve the purposes behind the exercise of the contempt power. 
[96] For example, this court may dismiss or refuse to hear proceedings brought by 
a party who is violating a court order: Breberin v. Santos, 2013 BCCA 385 at 
para. 14; Schmidtv. Wood, 2012 ABCA 235 at para. 5. 
[97] While barring a person in contempt from making use of the Court's process 
may be a smaller stick than imprisonment, it is nonetheless a means of enforcement 
of some significance. That is particularly so when a non-resident corporation carries 
on business in British Columbia and may be sued or wish to sue in these courts. 
Although Google's contracts with advertisers in British Columbia are by the choice of 
laws provisions to be determined in California, other causes of action in defamation 
or tort could well arise in British Columbia (see for example Trkulja v. Google (No 5), 
[2012] VSC 533, an Australian defamation case which raised issues of whether 
Google "publishes" the material displayed on its search engines). 
(ii:) An order made in California can be enforced 
[98] Google argues that the plaintiffs should apply in California because a 
California court order can be enforced against Google in that state. I accept that a 
California court order is easier to enforce in California than a British Columbia court 
order. However, related to the assertion that California is therefore a better forum is 
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the question of whether a California court could or would order the interlocutory relief 
sought by the plaintiffs. 
[99] Google asserts that the plaintiffs can make this application in California. 
However, Google bears the burden of proof at this stage of the analysis and has 
provided no support for that proposition. Indeed, neither party alluded to or 
attempted to prove California law. Although I need go no further given where the 
burden of proof lies, Canadian jurisprudence offers insight into the complexity of this 
question. 
[100] Assuming the plaintiffs could file an originating application in California, they 
would be asking for a standalone interim injunction with no underlying substantive 
relief sought in California. The Supreme Court of Canada has followed the approach 
taken by the UK House of Lords and determined that an interlocutory injunction can 
be issued in such circumstances, but only if two conditions are satisfied: 
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees Canadian Pacific System 
Federation v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1996] 2 S.C.R. 495. First, the issuing court 
must have jurisdiction simpliciter, and second, the substantive underlying dispute 
must be a cause of action recognized by the issuing court. As I noted, I have nothing 
before me to say whether California courts have adopted the same approach. 
[101] Furthermore, Google's assertion that the order sought in this court could not 
be enforced in California ignores the potential for the plaintiffs to sue on a British 
Columbia court order in California. That is a distinct legal step from applying for a 
standalone order in California, which Google contends is the appropriate procedure. 
[102] Google submits that the plaintiffs cannot enforce a British Columbia injunction 
in California. Google relies on Ingenium Technologies Corp. v. McGraw-Hill 
Companies, 2005 BCSC 465 at para. 28, in which Pitfield J., on a without notice 
application stated that "[a]n injunction is not a form of judgment or order on which 
[the plaintiff] could realistically sue for recognition and enforcement on a timely 
basis, if it would be able to sue on such judgment at all". I conclude from a review of 
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the case law that there are situations in which a party can sue for enforcement of a 
foreign interlocutory order. Certainly, the common law is evolving in that direction. 
[103] The Ontario Court of Appeal enforced a foreign interlocutory order in Cavell 
Insurance Co. Ltd. (Re) (2006), 80 O.R. (3d) 500, 269 D.L.R. (4th) 679 (C.A.). The 
British Columbia Court of Appeal addressed the trend towards enforcing foreign non-
monetary judgments in Minera Aquiline Argentina SA v. IMA Exploration Inc., 2007 
BCCA 319 at para. 92: 
[92] ... academic opinion is consistent with the general trend of private 
international law. The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that the law 
has evolved to allow courts to deal with disputes arising in an increasingly 
interdependent global economy. In its recent jurisprudence, the Supreme 
Court has reasoned that, in the proper case, the limits of the courts' 
jurisdiction should be expanded, not narrowed. In Pro Swing Inc. (at 
paras. 78-79), McLachlin C.J.C. (in dissent, but not on this issue) referred to 
Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 at 1098, Hunt 
v. T&N plc, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289 at 321-322, and Beals v. Saldanha, [2003] 3 
S.C.R. 416 at para. 27, for the rationale for extending the limits of the court's 
jurisdiction to enforce foreign non-monetary judgments. She commented that 
comity, order and fairness do not exclude the courts from enforcing foreign 
non-monetary judgments, and in the context of modern private international 
law, may require it. The majority of the Court in Pro Swing Inc. concluded that 
was not the right case to extend the jurisdiction, but all of the justices agreed 
that the "time is ripe to review the traditional common law rule" (para. 15) in 
light of changing global commercial realities. 
[104] Finally, I note that Google objects to British Columbia retaining jurisdiction 
because the order sought would require Google to take steps in relation to its 
websites worldwide. That objection is not resolved by "going to California". If the 
order involves worldwide relief, a California court will be no more appropriate a 
forum than British Columbia to make such an order. Even if the order can be 
construed more narrowly as requiring Google to take steps at the site where the 
computers controlling the search programs are located, Google has not established 
that those computers are located in California, or that they can only be 
reprogrammed there. 
[105] As the Court of Appeal observed in Olney v. Rainville, 2009 BCCA 380 at 
para. 27, "What is essential is that the taking of jurisdiction be consistent with order 
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and fairness." I conclude on this issue that Google has not established that 
California is a more appropriate forum than British Columbia for adjudicating the 
plaintiffs' application for an interim injunction against Google. 
3. Should the order sought be granted? 
[106] Having determined that the Court has jurisdiction over Google and that 
Google has not established that California is a more appropriate forum, we come to 
the heart of the matter: Should the injunction be granted? 
[107] Google asserts that the Court does not have the authority to make an order of 
the kind sought. In issue is whether the Court has "subject matter competence". The 
plaintiffs and Google agree that the type of order I am asked to make has never 
before been made by a Canadian court. 
[108] Google asserts that the Court lacks subject matter competence for two main 
reasons: first, because the order is sought against a non-party; second, because it 
would require the Court to make an order with worldwide effect. The latter objection 
may sound like an issue more properly addressed at the territorial competence stage 
of the analysis. However, the question of whether the Court has territorial 
competence to hear the application because of its connection to the persons or facts 
involved is distinct from the question of whether, in the words of s. 39 of the Law and 
Equity Act, it is "just or convenient" that the order sought should be made to enjoin or 
mandate the particular conduct. 
(a) Can an order be made against a non-party? 
[109] Google submits that as a general rule a Court does not have authority to 
make an order against a non-party who owes no duty to the plaintiff. Google 
acknowledges there are two exceptions to that rule, but argues that neither 
exception applies to this case. 
[110] The first exception arises when a non-party with knowledge of a court order 
deliberately disobeys it and thereby deprecates the Court's authority. This exception 
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was described by Lindley L.J. in Seavterd v. Paterson, [1897] 1 Ch. 545 (C.A.) at 
555-556: 
A motion to commit a man for breach of an injunction, which is technically 
wrong unless he is bound by the injunction, is one thing; and a motion to 
commit a man for contempt of Court, not because he is bound by the 
injunction by being a party to the cause, but because he is conducting himself 
so as to obstruct the course of justice, is another and totally different thing. In 
the one case the party who is bound by the injunction is proceeded against 
for the purpose of enforcing the order of the Court for the benefit of the 
person who got it. In the other case the Court will not allow its process to be 
set at naught and treated with contempt. In the one case the person who is 
interested in enforcing the order enforces it for his own benefit; in the other 
case, if the order of the Court has been contumaciously set at naught the 
offender cannot square it with the person who has obtained the order and 
save himself from the consequences of his act. The distinction between the 
two kinds of contempt is perfectly well known, although in some cases there 
may be a little difficulty in saying on which side of the line a case falls. As to 
the jurisdiction, if the facts are of the character I have stated, notwithstanding 
the arguments of Mr. Seward Brice, I cannot bring myself to entertain any 
difficulty about it. 
[111] Under this "contempt" exception, the Court's objective is not to further the 
interests of the plaintiffs, but to uphold its authority. 
[112] The plaintiffs argue that after Google received notice of this Court's orders 
against the defendants, it should not have allowed the defendants' websites to be 
displayed in Google's search results. The plaintiffs argue that this amounts to aiding 
and abetting the defendants' contempt and is comparable to Greenpeace Canada v. 
MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. (1994), 96 B.C.L.R. (2d) 201, 1994 CanLII 943 (C.A.), affd 
MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v Simpson, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 1048. In that case the Court 
granted an injunction preventing the defendants and all persons having notice of the 
order from physically obstructing the plaintiffs logging operations. Logging 
protestors who were not named as defendants protested that the order was 
overbroad. Macfarlane J.A. rejected that notion, citing with approval at para. 44 the 
following words from Robert J. Sharpe's text Injunctions and Specific Performance: 
It cannot be objected that the net of liability is cast too wide where the plaintiff 
is able to show that the non-party has deliberately agreed to flout the order at 
the instigation of the defendant. However, the court must be cautious not to 
hold in contempt a party who acts independently of the defendant, and who 
may exercise a right distinct from that of the defendant. Such a person has 
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not yet had his day in court and should not be bound by an order made in an 
action to which he was not a party. [Emphasis added.] 
[113] There is no evidence that Google acted in this case to deliberately flout this 
Court's orders and assist the defendants. While Google's search engines facilitate 
the defendants' ongoing breach by leading searchers to the defendants' websites, 
Google operates its search engines in the ordinary course of its business, 
independently of the defendants and not in order to assist them in their breach. 
[114] The plaintiffs' authorities involve quite different facts. In MacMillan Bloedel, 
those held in contempt had knowingly violated the court order to support the 
defendant's blockade of the logging road. In Glazer v. Union Contractors Ltd. and 
Thornton (1960), 25 D.L.R. (2d) 653, 33 W.W.R. 145 (B.C.S.C.) the Court had 
appointed a receiver over money owing to a company by the Government. A 
government minister, aware of the order but not a party to the proceeding, was 
committed for contempt for causing funds owing to the company to be paid to the 
company's order rather than to the receiver. In Attorney General v. Punch Ltd., 
[2002] UKHL 50, [2003] 1 All ER 289, an order prohibited the publication of certain 
information that the non-party published in its magazine when on notice of the order. 
In all of these cases, the non-parties found in contempt had engaged in conduct 
calculated to directly frustrate a court order. Google's search results are not of the 
same ilk. 
[115] The argument that Google aided and abetted the defendants' contempt of the 
existing court orders is stronger in relation to Google's sale of advertising space to 
the defendants. But as I noted earlier, when Google received notice of this Court's 
orders it agreed that it should not continue to do this. I accept that Google only 
continued to do so up to the commencement of this hearing due to an administrative 
oversight. 
[116] The second exception to the general rule that a Court will not make orders 
against a non-party extends to orders made against non-parties to aid in the fact 
finding necessary to the administration of justice. Examples of orders made against 
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non-parties who have no obligation to the plaintiff abound: subpoenas are issued to 
obtain evidence at trial under Rule 12-5(31)-(39); documents and oral evidence may 
also be obtained in advance of trial under Rules 7-1(18) and 7-5. 
[117] In addition, under the Nomich Pharmacal Co. and Others v. Customs and 
Excise Commissioners, [1974] A.C. 133, [1973] 2 All ER 943 (H.L.) [Nomich 
Pharmacal] line of authority, courts can make orders against non-parties even before 
an action is commenced. The remedy of pre-action discovery was articulated in 
Nomich Pharmacal by Lord Reed at 175: 
[I]f through no fault of his own a person gets mixed up in the tortious acts of 
others so as to facilitate their wrong-doing he may incur no personal liability 
but he comes under a duty to assist the person who has been wronged by 
giving him full information and disclosing the identity of the wrongdoers. I do 
not think that it matters whether he became so mixed up by voluntary action 
on his part or because it was his duty to do what he did. It may be that if this 
causes him expense the person seeking the information ought to reimburse 
him. But justice requires that he should co-operate in righting the wrong if he 
unwittingly facilitated its perpetration. 
Nomich Pharmacal has been adopted as part of the law in British Columbia: 
Kenney v. Loet4en (1999), 64 B.C.L.R. (3d) 346, 1999 CanLII 6110 (S.C.), Procon 
Mining and Tunnelling Ltd. et al. v. McNeil, Bonner et al., 2007 BCSC 454 [Procon 
Mining], and Pierce v. Canjex Publishing Ltd., 2011 BCSC 1503. 
[118] Google argues that the Norvtich Pharmacal line of authority goes no further 
than compelling a non-party to provide information and is only imposed in 
exceptional cases with due concern for the non-party against whom the order is 
sought: GEA Group AG v. Ventra Group Co., 2009 ONCA 619 [Ventre] at para. 85. 
[119] I do not accept Google's submission that the Court only has authority to make 
an order against a non-party in relation to contempt or to further fact finding 
necessary to effect justice. Lack of precedent should not be confused with lack of 
subject matter competence. 
[120] Lord Woolf M.R. described this distinction in Broadmoor Hospital Authority & 
Anor v. R, [1999] EWCA Civ 3039, [2000] QB 775 at para. 21: 
20
14
 B
C
SC
 1
06
3 
(C
an
LI
I)  
  
 
rti   i i    l i tif  nd:  i
 l   
 r l   
]  t rw
rw
l] i , i i
  l t  
rwi r c l 
li
 
tit   
  t r  
  
 i f r i  t i
il i  
rw l  
 . Loew  
i i  li  l, a
i i i   
] wi  i   
 t  i   
l    - rty    
 t a]  
] ’ i  rit  
t  i r 
  ti   l  t f sed i  
 
]  i i  
 
20
14
 B
CS
C 
10
63
 (C
an
LII
)
Case 5:17-cv-04207   Document 1   Filed 07/24/17   Page 45 of 143
- 32 - 
Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack Page 32 
[21] The powers of courts with equitable jurisdiction to grant injunctions 
are, subject to any relevant statutory restrictions, unlimited. Injunctions are 
granted only when to do so accords with equitable principles, but this 
restriction involves, not a defect of powers, but an adoption of doctrines and 
practices that change in their application from time to time. Unfortunately 
there have sometimes been made observations by judges that tend to 
confuse questions of jurisdiction or of powers with questions of discretions or 
of practice. The preferable analysis involves a recognition of the great width 
of equitable powers, an historical appraisal of the categories of injunctions 
that have been established and an acceptance that pursuant to general 
equitable principles injunctions may issue in new categories when this course 
appears appropriate. 
[121] The Court has inherent jurisdiction to maintain the rule of law and to control 
its own process. The power to grant injunctions is a broad one and is confirmed by 
s. 39 of the Law and Equity Act. Injunctions may be issued in "in all cases in which it 
appears to the court to be just or convenient that the order should be made ... on 
terms and conditions the court thinks just": MacMillan Bloedel, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 1048 
at para. 15. 
[122] The Court's willingness to use its equitable jurisdiction against non-parties is 
evident in the development of Mareva injunctions. This line of authority is particularly 
helpful because Mareva injunctions also involve orders against non-parties who 
reside outside of the province. 
[123] Madam Justice Newbury granted the first Mareva injunction in Canada in 
Mooneyv. Orr (1994), 98 B.C.L.R. (2d) 318 (S.C.) [Mooney No. 1] on an ex parte 
application. After referring to English and Australian cases granting such relief, she 
observed at para. 11: 
The reasons for extending Mareva injunctions to apply to foreign assets are 
valid in British Columbia no less than in England and Australia - the notion 
that a court should not permit a defendant to take action designed to frustrate 
existing or subsequent orders of the court, and the practical consideration 
that in this day of instant communication and paperless cross-border 
transfers, the courts must, in order to preserve the effectiveness of their 
judgments, adapt to new circumstances. 
[124] Madam Justice Huddart continued the injunction in a hearing two months later 
with both parties present: Mooney v. Orr (1994), 100 B.C.L.R. (2d) 335 (S.C.) 
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[Mooney No. 2]. She agreed that Mareva orders were a necessary development, 
saying at para. 60: 
Whether this extension of existing principles is seen as an expansion of the 
exercise of discretion given by the Law and Equity Act or inherent in the 
court's ability to control its process, I am of the view that such a discretion 
must be exercised whenever it is required to ensure the effective 
administration of justice in British Columbia.. 
[125] In England, where Mareva injunctions were first made in 1975, such orders 
were originally restricted to assets within England. In the late 1980s the English 
courts relaxed those restrictions to apply to the defendants' assets wherever they 
were situated, and ancillary orders were extended to non-parties resident in foreign 
countries. Non-parties could not only be restrained from dealing with the defendants' 
assets, but could also be mandated to take steps to transfer assets to a receiver 
located elsewhere: 
[126] The extra-territorial reach of these orders is evident. Vaughan Black and 
Edward Babin commented on the development of the law in "Mareva Injunctions in 
Canada: Territorial Aspects" (1997) 28 Can Bus IJ 430 at 441: 
All of these considerations [favouring the granting of extra-territorial orders] 
run up against one principal objection: the judicial power of all national courts 
is territorially circumscribed and it is improper for a court to attempt to 
exercise its power to affect actions outside the court's territory. Stated so 
broadly, that limitation must now be seen as dated and lacking in general 
validity, or at least subject to several exceptions. There now seems little 
doubt that Canadian courts actually have the power to employ in personam  
orders to enjoin parties to do or refrain from doing something anywhere in the  
world. [Emphasis added.] 
[127] The expansion of Mareva orders to include non-parties resulted from the 
Courts' recognition that Mareva injunctions would have no practical effect without 
involving non-parties. That is so because unscrupulous defendants will simply fail to 
comply with the injunction, whereas the defendants' brokers, accountants, lawyers 
and bankers are less likely to engage in such conduct. However, as Black & Babin 
observed at 453, the rights of non-parties and the states in which they reside must 
be taken into account: 
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[T]his practical need to control the actions of non-parties must, as is the case 
with parties, be balanced against such persons' legitimate interests in privacy 
and liberty of action (including such rights as they may have acquired by 
contract), and against the rights of other states to sovereign jurisdiction over 
persons and activities within their boundaries. 
[128] The Courts have developed protections for non-parties who are not resident 
in the province, or who may have a presence within this jurisdiction but are also 
present or resident in a number of jurisdictions outside the territory. In recognition of 
the fact that such persons may be subject to laws in force in the foreign jurisdiction 
which forbid compliance with an order made by this Court, the Court has included in 
worldwide Mareva injunctions terms which have come to be known as the "Babanaft" 
and "Baltic" provisos. 
[129] Stephen Pitel and Andrew Valentine describe these provisos and the 
rationale behind their inclusion in worldwide Mareva injunctions in "The Evolution of 
the Extra-Territorial Mareva Injunction in Canada: Three Issues" (2006) 2 J P Int'l L 
339 at 371-377. Babanaft and Baltic provisos are intended to ensure that courts do 
not exercise exorbitant jurisdiction over non-parties situated abroad and are 
particularly important in defining the effect of worldwide Mareva injunctions on 
corporate non-parties with a presence both inside and outside the local jurisdiction. 
[130] The Babanaft proviso states in part that where a corporate non-party has a 
presence in and outside of the jurisdiction, it must have notice of the order and the 
ability to restrain activities abroad that would aid in violation of the injunction. 
[131] The Baltic proviso permits corporate non-parties to comply with their foreign 
legal obligations as they reasonably perceive them. 
[132] Although Mareva injunctions are granted at the plaintiffs suit, a Mareva 
order's primary function is maintaining the integrity of the Court's process. Madam 
Justice Huddart wrote in Grenzservice Speditions Ges.m.b.h v. Jans (1995), 15 
B.C.L.R. (3d) 370, 1995 CanLII 2507 (S.C.) at para. 92: 
[92] The Mareva and Anton Pillar orders were conceived not so much to 
protect plaintiffs as to protect the Court's jurisdiction against defendants bent 
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on dissipating or secreting their assets or evidence in order to render 
inconsequential the judicial process against them.... 
[133] I conclude that the Court has authority to grant an injunction against a non-
party resident in a foreign jurisdiction in appropriate circumstances. The fact that an 
injunction has not before been made against an intemet search provider such as 
Google is reason to tread carefully, but does not establish that the Court does not 
have subject matter competence. Indeed, the notion that a court may only make the 
orders it has made in the past is anathema to the spirit of the common law. As 
Newbury J. observed in Mooney No. 1 at para. 11: 
... the courts must, in order to preserve the effectiveness of their judgments, 
adapt to new circumstances. Such adaptability has always been, and 
continues to be, the genius of the common law. 
(b) Should I make this order against Google? 
[134] Having determined that the Court has authority to issue an injunction with 
extra-territorial effect against a non-party where it is just or convenient to do so, the 
question remains: should I grant the injunction on the facts of this case? A related 
question is what test should be applied in making that determination. 
[135] Google submits that it would not be just to make the order sought for four 
reasons. 
[136] First, Google says that it provides an important and valuable tool for 
navigating hundreds of trillions of webpages on the intemet. Google argues it 
cannot, as a practical matter, monitor content or arbitrate disputes over content 
because of the enormous volume of content; because it cannot determine whether 
information is inaccurate or lawful; and because content on websites is constantly 
changing so even if Google could form judgments about the content of sites on its 
index at any given moment, those judgments would be obsolete moments later. 
[137] Whether Google is a passive indexer with no control over content has been 
the subject of litigation in other jurisdictions: Gonzalez, Max Mosely, and Trkulja. 
However, the order sought in the present case would not require Google to monitor 
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the content of the defendants' websites. Rather, the order would simply require 
Google to remove all of the defendants' websites from its searches. To put it simply, 
it is not a question of blocking what is being said, but rather who is saying it. The 
order is, in many ways, only a slight expansion on the removal of individual URLs, 
which Google agreed to do voluntarily. 
[138] Second, Google submits it would be unjust to make the order sought because 
de-indexing entire websites without regard to content of the specific URLs would 
constitute undue censorship. Google's employee Mr. Smith deposed: 
URLs not specifically reviewed and identified may be used for any number of 
innocent purposes and a complete removal could result in possibly numerous 
URLs being blocked without Google having had the opportunity to review 
them and determine if a departure from its usual indexing process is 
necessary or warranted in the circumstances. 
[139] I do not find this argument persuasive. Google acknowledges that it alters 
search results to avoid generating links to child pornography and "hate speech" 
websites. It recognizes its corporate responsibility in this regard, employing 47 full-
time employees worldwide who, like Mr. Smith, take down specific websites, 
including websites subject to court order. Excluding the defendant's prohibited 
websites from search results is in keeping with Google's approach to blocking 
websites subject to court order. 
[140] Third, Google argues that the Court should not make an order that could 
affect searches worldwide because it would put Google in the impossible situation of 
being ordered to do something that could require it to contravene a law in another 
jurisdiction. This raises the concern addressed by the Baltic proviso in Mareva 
injunctions. 
[141] Google gives as an example of such jurisdictional difficulties the case of 
Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racism et LAntisemitisme [Yahoo]. In 2000 two 
French anti-racism groups filed a suit in France against Yahoo alleging that Yahoo 
violated a French law prohibiting the display of Nazi paraphernalia by permitting 
users of its internet auction services to display and sell such artifacts. The plaintiffs 
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demanded that Yahoo's French subsidiary, Yahoo.fr, remove all hyperlinks to the 
parent website (Yahoo.com) containing the offending content. As in this case, Yahoo 
argued that the French Court lacked jurisdiction over the matter because its servers 
were located in the United States. The French Court held that it could properly 
assert jurisdiction because the damage was suffered in France and required Yahoo 
to "take all necessary measures" to "dissuade and render impossible" all access via 
yahoo.com by intemet users in France to the Yahoo! intemet auction service 
displaying Nazi artifacts, as well as to block internet users in France from accessing 
other online Nazi material: 145 F Supp 2d 1168 (ND Cal 2001) at 1172. 
[142] Yahoo claimed that implementing the order would violate its First Amendment 
rights to freedom of expression and therefore could not be enforced in the United 
States. The French Court did not accept that submission. Yahoo initiated a suit in 
California against the French plaintiffs, and obtained a declaratory judgment that the 
French orders were constitutionally unenforceable in the United States, contrary to 
the first amendment. Addressing the issue of international comity, the Court 
reasoned that United States Courts will generally recognize and enforce foreign 
judgments but could not do so on the facts of that case because enforcement of the 
French orders would violate Yahoo's constitutional rights to free speech: 169 F Supp 
2d 1181 (ND Cal 2001) at 1192-1193. This decision was ultimately reversed on 
different grounds: 379 F 3d 1120 (9th Cir 2004), reheard in 433 F 3d 1199 (9th Cir 
2006). 
[143] Yahoo provides a cautionary note. As with Mareva injunctions, courts must be 
cognizant of potentially compelling a non-party to take action in a foreign jurisdiction 
that would breach the law in that jurisdiction. That concern can be addressed in 
appropriate cases, as it is for Mareva injunctions, by inserting a Baltic type proviso, 
which would excuse the non-party from compliance with the order if to do so would 
breach local laws. 
[144] In the present case, Google is before this Court and does not suggest that an 
order requiring it to block the defendants' websites would offend California law, or 
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indeed the law of any state or country from which a search could be conducted. 
Google acknowledges that most countries will likely recognize intellectual property 
rights and view the selling of pirated products as a legal wrong. 
[145] Fourth, Google argues that the order sought is too broad. Google submits that 
if the injunction is granted it should be limited to Google.ca, the website designated 
for Canada, because no court should make an order that has a reach that extends 
around the world. 
[146] I note again that on the record before me, the injunction would compel Google 
to take steps in California or the state in which its search engine is controlled, and 
would not therefore direct that steps be taken around the world. That the effect of the 
injunction could reach beyond one state is a separate issue. Even an order 
mandating or enjoining conduct entirely within British Columbia may have such 
extraterritorial, or even worldwide effect. 
[147] For example, a non-party corporation that warehouses and ships goods for a 
defendant manufacturing company might be ordered on an interim injunction to 
freeze the defendants' goods and refrain from shipping them. That injunction could 
affect orders received from customers around the world. Could it sensibly be argued 
that the Court could not grant the injunction because it would have effects 
worldwide? The impact of an injunction on strangers to the suit or the order itself is a 
valid consideration in deciding whether to exercise the Court's jurisdiction to grant an 
injunction. It does not, however, affect the Court's authority to make such an order. 
[148] Further, although Google has a website for each country to which searches 
made within that country default, users can override that default and access other 
country's Google websites. For example, even if the defendants' websites were 
blocked from searches conducted through www.google.ca, Canadian users can go 
to www.google.co.uk or www.google.fr and obtain results including the defendants' 
websites. On the record before me it appears that to be effective, even within 
Canada, Google must block search results on all of its websites. Furthermore, the 
defendants' sales originate primarily in other countries, so the Court's process 
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cannot be protected unless the injunction ensures that searchers from any 
jurisdiction do not find the defendants' websites. 
[149] Google relies on Max Mosely in which the Regional Court of Paris acceded to 
Google's argument that removal of images should be restricted to searches that 
could be conducted from within France (English translation of Max Moselyat 13). 
That restriction was based on the images constituting a breach of France's penal 
code; publication of the images was not a breach of the laws of other countries. The 
French Court therefore ordered Google to remove the images from the "search 
engine that it operates, accessible in France". Max Mosely is distinguishable on that 
basis. 
[150] Accepting that an order with worldwide effect can be granted, what test 
should be applied in determining whether it should be granted? I conclude that the 
order sought against a non-party requires the Court to consider the standard test for 
granting an injunction but modified to take into account the direction to a non-party. 
In Mooney No. 2, Huddart J. described an appropriate standard at p. 22: 
The comparable approach to a Mareva injunction would be to require a 
strong prima facie (...) or a good arguable case (...) to cross the threshold, 
and then to balance the interests of the two parties, having regard to all the 
relevant factors in each case, to reach a just and convenient result. 
[151] The fair question to be tried relates of course to the plaintiffs' claim against 
the defendants, since that is the cause of action in relation to which the injunction is 
sought. Google takes no issue with that. In this case the plaintiffs have not only 
raised an arguable claim; two of the defendants' defences have been struck and 
they are presumed to have admitted the allegations. 
[152] As for balancing the interests of the plaintiffs and non-party Google, the 
plaintiffs have established that they are suffering irreparable harm by the defendants' 
ongoing sale of the GW1000 on the internet. The plaintiffs have also established that 
Google is inadvertently facilitating that harm through its search engines. While there 
are other search engines, Google does not contest the plaintiffs' assertion that 
Google's position as the search engine used for 70-75% of internet searches means 
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the defendants will not be commercially successful if they cannot be found through 
Google's search services. 
[153] Google acknowledges that it can do what is being asked of it. Google does 
not assert that it would be inconvenienced in any material way or that it would incur 
expense to do so. The balance of convenience thus favours granting the injunction. 
[154] Consideration of the factors identified in Nomich Pharmacal may also be of 
assistance: Procon Mining at para. 27; Ventra at para. 50. Modified to reflect the 
relief sought in this case they include: 
a. Whether the applicant has provided evidence sufficient to raise a valid, 
bona fide or reasonable claim; 
b. Whether the applicant has established a relationship with the third 
party such that it establishes that the third party is somehow involved 
in the acts complained of; 
c. Whether the third party is the only practicable means to obtain the 
relief sought; 
d. Whether the third party can be indemnified for costs to which the third 
party may be exposed because of the order; and 
e. Whether the interests of justice favour the granting of the relief sought. 
[155] To this list of considerations I would add the degree to which the interests of 
those other than the applicant and the identified non-party could be affected — here 
potential purchasers will not be able to find and buy the defendants' products as 
easily, but that is as it should be in light of the existing court orders prohibiting the 
defendants from selling the GW1000 and related products. 
[156] Google is an innocent bystander but it is unwittingly facilitating the 
defendants' ongoing breaches of this Court's orders. There is no other practical way 
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for the defendants' website sales to be stopped. There is no other practical way to 
remove the defendants' websites from Google's search results. 
[157] The fundamental question in each case is whether the granting of an 
injunction is just and equitable in all of the circumstances of the case: Tracey v. 
Instaloans Financial Solutions Centres (B.C.) Ltd., 2007 BCCA 481 at para. 31. A 
judge must not become the prisoner of a formula. As Saunders J.A. observed in 
Tracey at para. 33: 
... the criteria [for determining whether to grant an injunction] are only a 
judicial expression or explanation of the statutory authority for injunctions in 
s. 39(1) of the Law and Equity Act, ... 
39(1) An injunction or an order in the nature of mandamus may be 
granted or a receiver or receiver manager appointed by an 
interlocutory order of the court in all cases in which it appears to the 
court to be just or convenient that the order should be made. 
[Emphasis in original] 
[158] In determining whether this interim injunction should be granted, I am mindful 
of Madam Justice Newbury's admonition that a court should not permit a defendant 
to frustrate orders of the court and that "courts must, in order to preserve the 
effectiveness of their judgments, adapt to new circumstances": Mooney (No. 1) at 
paras. 10-11. 
[159] The Court must adapt to the reality of e-commerce with its potential for abuse 
by those who would take the property of others and sell it through the borderless 
electronic web of the internet. I conclude that an interim injunction should be granted 
compelling Google to block the defendants' websites from Google's search results 
worldwide. That order is necessary to preserve the Court's process and to ensure 
that the defendants cannot continue to flout the Court's orders. 
[160] Non-parties affected by Mareva injunctions are not normally before the Court, 
because applications of that kind are brought without notice. Google was named in 
this application, served with materials, and attended the hearing. It is not therefore 
necessary to craft terms anticipating possible conflicts Google could face in 
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complying with the interim injunction. No terms of this kind have been requested by 
Google and I see no basis on the record before me to expect such difficulties. 
VI. CONCLUSION  
[161] I conclude that the interim injunction sought should be granted: 
Within 14 days of the date of this judgment, Google Inc. is to cease indexing 
or referencing in search results on its internet search engines the websites 
contained in Schedule A to the notice of application. 
VII. COSTS 
[162] The plaintiffs are entitled to special costs of this application against the 
defendants Morgan Jack, Datalink 4 and Datalink 7. Special costs are justified 
because the plaintiffs application to enjoin Google was made necessary by the 
defendants' flagrant and ongoing breaches of this Court's orders. 
The Honourable Madam Justice L.A. Fenlon 
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SUPREME COURT 
OF 
NE 
COLUMUIA 
VA COUVER REGISTRY 
SP 2 2 2014 
ENTF RED 
BETWEEN:  
No. S112421 
Vancouver Registry 
E COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA 
EQUUSTEK SOLUTIONS INC., 
ROBERT ANGUS, and CLARMA ENTERPRISES INC. 
PLAINTIFFS 
AND: 
MORGAN JACK, ANDREW CRAWFORD, 
DATALINK TECHNOLOGIES GATEWAYS INC., DATALINK 5, DATALINK 6, 
JOHN DOE, DATALINK TECHNOLOGIES GATEWAYS LLC, LEE INGRAHAM, MIKE 
BUNKER, and IGOR C,HEIFOT 
DEFENDANTS 
ORDER MADE AFTER APPLICATION 
BEFORE ) THE HONOURABLE ) Friday, the 13th day of 
) MADAM JUSTICE FENLON ) June 2014 
ON THE APPLICATION of the plaintiffs dated November 13, 2012, coming on for 
hearing at Vancouvern October 22 and 23, 2013, and February 7, 2014, and on 
hearing Robbie Fleming, counsel for the plaintiffs, and Stephen R. Schachter Q.C. and 
Geoffrey B. Gomery Q.C., counsel for the application respondents Google Canada 
Corporation and Google Inc., and no one appearing for the remaining defendants; and 
on reading further written submissions dated March 7 and 24, 2014, and May 23 and 
29, 2014; and JUDGMENT BEING RESERVED TO THIS DATE: 
THIS COURT ORDERS THAT: 
1. Within 14 days of the date of this order, Google Inc. is to cease indexing or 
referencing in search results on its internet search engines the websites listed 
in Schedule A, including all of the subpages and subdirectories of the listed 
websites, until the conclusion of the trial of this action or further order of this 
court; 
2. By September 23, 2014, Google Inc. is to cease indexing or referencing in 
search results on its internet search engines the websites listed in the following 
011867\001\00076680 www.roberffieminglawyers.com 
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lawyer for the plaintiffs 
obbie Fleming 
Signature o.---fawyer for Google C nada Corporation 
and Google Inc. 
Geoffrey B. Gomery 
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schedules, including all of the subpages and subdirectories of the listed 
websites: 
a. the additional websites referenced in the December 13, 2012 Order of 
Tindale J., as set out in "Schedule B" attached, and 
b. the additional websites referenced during the hearing of this application, 
as set out in "Schedule C" attached; 
until the conclusion of the trial of this action or further order of this court; 
3. The plaintiffs and Google Inc. have liberty to apply to vary any part of this order, 
including the Schedules; 
4. Madam Justice Fenton is seized of any applications brought pursuant to 
paragraph 3 above; and 
5. The plaintiffs are awarded special costs of this application against the 
defendants Morgan Jack, Datalink Technologies Gateways Inc. and Datalink 
Technologies Gateways LLC. 
THE FOLLOWING PARTIES APPROVE THE FORM OF THIS ORDER AND 
CONSENT TO EACH OF THE ORDERS, IF ANY, THAT ARE INDICATED ABOVE AS 
BEING BY CONSENT: 
011867\001\00076680 www.robertfleminglawyers.com 
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"Schedule A" 
wwvv.datatechgateways.com 
www.gw1000.com 
www.protocolconverter.com 
www.datalinkgateways.com 
www. datalink-gateways. com 
www.datalink-networks.com 
www.1770-kf3.com 
www.1784-ktx.corn 
www.1784-pcmk.com 
www.datalinkcontrollers.corn 
www.datalink-networking.corn 
www.datalinkgw1000.com 
wwvv.datalinkinterfaces.corn 
www.gw-1000.com 
www.1784u2dhp.com 
wvvw.dhtoethernet.corn 
vvvvw.datalinkconverters.corn 
011867\001\00076680 www.robertfleminglawyers.com 
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"Schedule B" 
www.multigatecommunications.com 
 
www.americangatewaycorp. corn 
www.ethernetinterfaces.com  
wvvw.ethernetdhplus. corn 
www.gatewayinterfaces.com  
www.m ultigatecom .com 
www.dlgw1000.com  
wvvw.gw1000-dh4851.com  
www. gateway-1000. corn 
wvvw.gatewaytech 1000. corn 
011867\001\00076680 www.robertfleminglawyers,com 
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"Schedule C" 
wvvw.eth ernetdatah ighway. corn 
vvww.dl-gw-1 000. com  
www.abethernetsolutions.com  
www.dhethernetprotocol.com  
www.gw1000-dhp1.com  
www.1770kf2.com  
011867\001\00076680 www.robertfleminglawyers.com 
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ENTERED 
 
No. S112421 
Vancouver Registry 
  
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA 
BETWEEN: 
EQUUSTEK SOLUTIONS INC., 
ROBERT ANGUS, and CLARMA ENTERPRISES INC. 
PLAINTIFFS 
AND: 
MORGAN JACK, ANDREW CRAWFORD, 
DATALINK TECHNOLOGY GATEWAYS INC., DATALINK 5, DATALINK 6, 
JOHN DOE, DATALINK TECHNOLOGIES GATEWAYS LLC, LEE INGRAHAM, MIKE 
BUNKER and IGOR CHIEFOT 
DEFENDANTS 
ORDER MADE AFTER APPLICATION 
BEFORE ) THE HONOURABLE ) Thursday, the 27th day of 
) MADAM JUSTICE FENLON ) November 2014 
ON THE APPLICATION of the plaintiffs dated November 12, 2014, coming on for 
hearing at Vancouver, BC, on November 27, 2014 and on hearing John Zeljkovich, 
counsel for the plaintiffs, and Geoffrey B. Gomery Q.C., counsel for the application 
respondent Google Inc., and no one appearing for the remaining defendants; 
THIS COURT ORDERS THAT: 
1. The June 13, 2014 order made in this action be varied to include the additional 
websites listed as Schedule "A" to this order; 
www.robertfleminglawyers.com  
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2. Within 14 days of the date of this order, Google Inc. cease indexing or 
referencing in search results on its internet search engines the websites listed in 
Schedule "A to this order, including all subpages and subdirectories of those 
websites, until the conclusion of the trial of this action or further order of this 
court; 
3. Future applications brought by the plaintiffs to vary the Schedules contained in 
the June 13, 2014 order made in this action can be made by giving written notice 
of their application (including supporting materials) to Google Inc. (without notice 
to any of the other defendants), and requiring that Google Inc. inform the 
plaintiffs of its position in response to the application within 5 business days; in 
the event that Google Inc. opposes the application, the matter may be set down 
in the usual manner, with the plaintiffs providing notice to Google Inc. and the 
defendant Igor Cheifot; and in the event that Google Inc. does not oppose the 
application, the plaintiffs may proceed with the matter by way of desk order; 
4. By consent, this order, and any subsequent orders amending or supplementing 
the Schedules contained in the June 13, 2014 order made in this action, will 
stand, fall or be varied according to any order pronounced by the Court of Appeal 
from the order pronounced June 13, 2014. 
THE FOLLOWING PARTIES APPROVE THE FORM OF THIS ORDER AND CONSENT 
TO EACH OF THE ORDERS, IF ANY, THAT ARE INDICATED ABOVE AS BEING BY 
CONSENT: 
Signatu of lawyer for the plaintiffs 
John Zeljkovich 
Signature of law r for Google Inc. 
Geoffrey B. Gomery, Q.C. 
By the Court. 
Registrar 
www.robertfleminglawyers.com  
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Schedule A 
www.1784pktx.com   
www.controllogixethernet.com 
  
www.controllogixqateways.com  
www.datalink-converters.com 
  
www.datalink-interfaces.com 
  
www.datalinkconverters.com 
 
www.dhpqateway.com 
 
www.dhpgateways.com 
  
www.dhptoethernet.com 
  
www.ethernetqateways.com 
  
www.ethernetipconverter.com 
  
www.ethernetipdhplus.com 
  
www.gatewayprotocol.com 
  
www.gatewayprotocols.com 
  
www.gatewaytodhp.com 
  
www.gw1000-abeip.com 
  
www.gw1000-dh485eip.com 
 
www.qw1000-dh485me.com 
  
www.gw1000-dhpa.com 
  
www.gw1000-dhpm.com 
  
www.multi-gateways.com 
  
www.multigateprotocols.com 
  
www.robertfleminglawyers.com 
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Vancouver Registry 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA 
BETWEEN: 
EQUUSTEK SOLUTIONS INC., 
ROBERT ANGUS, and CLARMA ENTERPRISES LTD. 
PLAINTIFFS 
AND: 
MORGAN JACK aka MATT GARCIA aka MATT GARCI aka IAN TAYLOR, 
ANDREW CRAWFORD aka DEREK SMYTHE, 
DATALINK TECHNOLOGY GATEWAYS INC., DATALINK 5, DATALINK 6, 
JOHN DOE, DATALINK TECHNOLOGIES GATEWAYS LLC, 
LEE INGRAHAM aka DARREN LANGDON, MIKE BUNKER, 
IGOR CHEIFOT aka JOLIO FERNANDEZ, 
ALEXANDER CHEIFOT aka RANDY SCHTOLZ, 
FRANK GEIGER aka FELIX FERNANDEZ, and 
ALFONSO DOE 
DEFENDANTS 
ORDER MADE AFTER APPLICATION 
) ) 
BEFORE ) )y4 u-tAtviE ft-w- Comer )) April 204 
, theZ day of 
ON THE APPLICATION of the plaintiffs without a hearing and on reading the materials 
filed by the plaintiffs; 
THIS COURT ORDERS THAT: 
1. The June 13, 2014 order made in this action be varied to include the additional 
websites listed as Schedule "A" to this order; and 
2. Within 14 days of the date of this order, Google Inc. cease indexing or 
referencing in search results on its internet search engines the websites listed in 
Schedule "A to this order, including all subpages and subdirectories of those 
www.robertfleminglawyers.com  
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websites, until the conclusion of the trial of this action or further order of this 
court. 
THE FOLLOWING PARTIES APPROVE THE FORM OF THIS ORDER AND CONSENT 
TO EACH OF THE ORDERS, IF ANY, THAT ARE INDICATED ABOVE AS BEING BY 
CONSENT: 
Sign re of lawyer for the plaintiffs 
Jo Zeljkovich 
By the Court. 
www.robertfleminglawyers.com  
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I \I THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA 
EQUUSTEK SOLUTIONS INC., 
ROBERT ANGUS, and CLARMA ENTERPRISES LTD. 
PLAINTIFFS 
MORGAN JACK aka MATT GARCIA aka MATT GARCI aka IAN TAYLOR, 
ANDREW CRAWFORD aka DEREK SMYTHE, 
DATALINK TECHNOLOGY GATEWAYS INC., DATALINK 5, DATALINK 6, 
JOHN DOE, DATALINK TECHNOLOGIES GATEWAYS LLC, 
LEE INGRAHAM aka DARREN LANGDON, MIKE BUNKER, 
IGOR CHEIFOT aka JOLIO FERNANDEZ, 
ALEXANDER CHEIFOT aka RANDY SCHTOLZ, 
FRANK GEIGER aka FELIX FERNANDEZ, and 
ALFONSO DOE 
DEFENDANTS 
ORDER MADE AFTER APPLICATION 
BEFORE 
E OF 11 
) Co LA (Z-T 
) 
) litAte,5o( , the  1(14day of 
) June 2015 
ON THE APPLICATION of the plaintiffs without a hearing and on reading the materials 
filed by the plaintiffs; 
THIS COURT ORDERS THAT; 
1. The June 13, 2014 order made in this action be varied to include the additional 
websites listed as Schedule "A" to this order; and 
2. Within 14 days of the date of this order, Google Inc. cease indexing or 
referencing in search results on its internet search engines the websites listed in 
Schedule "A to this order, including all subpages and subdirectories of those 
wwvv.robertfleminglawyers.com  
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websites, until the conclusion of the trial of this action or further order of this 
court. 
THE FOLLOWING PARTIES APPROVE THE FORM OF THIS ORDER AND CONSENT 
TO EACH OF THE ORDERS, IF ANY, THAT ARE INDICATED ABOVE AS BEING BY 
CONSENT: 
Signatvre-4Sf lawyer for the plaintiffs 
John Zeljkovich 
www.robertfleminglawyers.com 
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Schedule A 
www.qateway-owl 000dhpl.com  
www.datalink-gw1000abeip.corn 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA 
BETWEEN: 
EQUUSTEK SOLUTIONS INC., 
ROBERT ANGUS, and CLARMA ENTERPRISES LTD. 
PLAINTIFFS 
AND: 
MORGAN JACK aka MATT GARCIA aka MATT GARCI aka IAN TAYLOR, 
ANDREW CRAWFORD aka DEREK SMYTHE, 
DATALINK TECHNOLOGY GATEWAYS INC., DATALINK 5, DATALINK 6, 
JOHN DOE, DATALINK TECHNOLOGIES GATEWAYS LLC, 
LEE INGRAHAM aka DARREN LANGDON, MIKE BUNKER, 
IGOR CHEIFOT aka JOLIO FERNANDEZ, 
ALEXANDER CHEIFOT aka RANDY SCHTOLZ, 
FRANK GEIGER aka FELIX FERNANDEZ, and 
ALFONSO DOE 
DEFENDANTS 
ORDER MADE AFTER APPLICATION 
BEFORE 
) ) 
) -I\ Cc-Ir."- c>f= 1-1.+C' ) 
) ) 
) ) 
Fr (40-41 
 the 
 3  day of 
July 2015 
ON THE APPLICATION of the plaintiffs without a hearing and on reading the materials 
filed by the plaintiffs; 
THIS COURT ORDERS THAT: 
1. The June 13, 2014 order made in this action be varied to include the additional 
websites listed as Schedule "A" to this order; and 
2. Within 14 days of the date of this order, Google Inc. cease indexing or 
referencing in search results on its internet search engines the websites listed in 
Schedule "A" to this order, including all subpages and subdirectories of those 
www.robertilerninglawyers.com 
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websites, until the conclusion of the trial of this action or further order of this 
court. 
THE FOLLOWING PARTIES APPROVE THE FORM OF THIS ORDER AND CONSENT 
TO EACH OF THE ORDERS, IF ANY, THAT ARE INDICATED ABOVE AS BEING BY 
CONSENT: 
Signatut df1awyer for the p aintiffs 
John eljkovich 
By the Court. 
Registrar 
www.robertfleminglawyers.com  
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Schedule A 
www.datalink-qw1000-abeip.com   
https://ethernetiptodhplus.wordpress.com  
www.ethernettodatahiqhwayplus.corn  
www.datahighwayplustoethernet.corn  
www.robertfleminglawyers.corn 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA 
BETWEEN: 
EQUUSTEK SOLUTIONS INC., 
ROBERT ANGUS, and CLARMA ENTERPRISES LTD. 
PLAINTIFFS 
AND: 
MORGAN JACK aka MATT GARCIA aka MATT GARCI aka IAN TAYLOR, 
ANDREW CRAWFORD aka DEREK SMYTHE, 
DATALINK TECHNOLOGY GATEWAYS INC., DATALINK 5, DATALINK 6, 
JOHN DOE, DATALINK TECHNOLOGIES GATEWAYS LLC, 
LEE INGRAHAM aka DARREN LANGDON, MIKE BUNKER, 
IGOR CHEIFOT aka JOLIO FERNANDEZ, 
ALEXANDER CHEIFOT aka RANDY SCHTOLZ, 
FRANK GEIGER aka FELIX FERNANDEZ, and 
ALFONSO DOE 
DEFENDANTS 
ORDER MADE AFTER APPLICATION 
et‘A ) ) 
BEFORE ) TAE=-E-1-10- NOURABLE ) (°1");   , the  ‘'  day of 
) JUST-AGE  ) 2015 
) 
ON THE APPLICATION of the plaintiffs without a hearing and on reading the materials 
filed by the plaintiffs; 
THIS COURT ORDERS THAT: 
1. The June 13, 2014 order made in this action be varied to include the additional 
websites listed as Schedule "A" to this order; and 
2. Within 14 days of the date of this order, Google Inc. cease indexing or 
referencing in search results on its internet search engines the websites listed in 
Schedule "A" to this order, including all subpages and subdirectories of those 
www.robertfleminglawyers.com 
 
Case 5:17-cv-04207   Document 1   Filed 07/24/17   Page 77 of 143
- 104 - 
websites, until the conclusion of the trial of this action or further order of this 
court. 
THE FOLLOWING PARTIES APPROVE THE FORM OF THIS ORDER AND CONSENT 
TO EACH OF THE ORDERS, IF ANY, THAT ARE INDICATED ABOVE AS BEING BY 
CONSENT: 
SignaturOlawyer for the plaintiffs 
John Zeljkoyich 
By the Court. 
www.robertfleminglawyers.corn 
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Schedule A 
www.datalinkqw1000abeip.com  
https://plus.google.cam/+Ethernetallenbradleydhplus  
https://kinja.com/datalinkgw1000   
https://datalinkgw1000.wordpress.corn   
www.robertfleminglawyers.com 
Case 5:17-cv-04207   Document 1   Filed 07/24/17   Page 79 of 143
'", 
V11 :1(A OiVi* No. S112421 
Vancouver Registry 
HE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA 
EQUUSTEK SOLUTIONS INC., 
ROBERT ANGUS, and CLARMA ENTERPRISES LTD. 
PLAINTIFFS 
AND: 
MORGAN JACK aka MATT GARCIA aka MATT GARCI aka IAN TAYLOR, 
ANDREW CRAWFORD aka DEREK SMYTHE, 
DATALINK TECHNOLOGY GATEWAYS INC., DATALINK 5, DATALINK 6, 
JOHN DOE, DATALINK TECHNOLOGIES GATEWAYS LLC, 
LEE INGRAHAM aka DARREN LANGDON, MIKE BUNKER, 
IGOR CHEIFOT aka JOLIO FERNANDEZ, 
ALEXANDER CHEIFOT aka RANDY SCHTOLZ, 
FRANK GEIGER aka FELIX FERNANDEZ, and 
ALFONSO DOE 
DEFENDANTS 
ORDER MADE AFTER APPLICATION 
) ) 
BEFORE ) A JUDGE OF THE COURT ) IllAV,SIVN  , the  l'Z'Mday of 
)   ) OfinikAMI -2015.  L/op L., 
) ) 
) ) 
ON THE APPLICATION of the plaintiffs without a hearing and on reading the materials 
filed by the plaintiffs; 
THIS COURT ORDERS THAT: 
1. The June 13, 2014 order made in this action be varied to include the additional 
website listed in Schedule "A" to this order; 
2. Within 14 days of the date of this order, Google Inc. cease indexing or 
referencing in search results on its Internet search engines the websites listed 
in Schedule "A" to this order, including all subpages and subdirectories of those 
www.robertfleminglawyers.com  
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websites, until the conclusion of the trial of this action or further order of this 
court; and 
3. The June 13, 2014 order made in this action be varied to include a term that 
within 14 days of the date of this order, Google Inc. cease indexing or referencing 
in search results on its internet search engines the URLs listed in Schedule "B" to 
this order until the conclusion of the trial of this action or further order of this 
court. 
THE FOLLOWING PARTIES APPROVE THE FORM OF THIS ORDER AND CONSENT 
TO EACH OF THE ORDERS, IF ANY, THAT ARE INDICATED ABOVE AS BEING BY 
CONSENT: 
Signatwe of lawyer for the plaintiffs 
JohneZeljkovich 
By the Court. 
Registrar 
www.robertfleminglawyers.com 
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Schedule A 
1. http://www.ethernet-datahighwayplus.com  
www.robertfleminglawyers,com 
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Schedule B 
1. httpillwww.pccweb.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/C Data Link Technologies.pdf; 
2. http://www.modbus.org/viewdevicephp?id=335;   
3. http://www.manualslib.com/manual/665918/11i-Datalink-Gw1000.html;  
4. http://www.automation .com/product-showcase/gw1000-abeip-allen-bradly-data-high-
way-plus-converter; 
5. http://datalinkgw1000.kinja.com/gw1000-dhpe-ethernet-df1-dh-1721122330;  
6. httpl/www.iebmedia.com/index,php?id=10610&parentid=52&themeid=222&hpid=4&  
showdetail=true&bb=1; 
7. http://www.emobility24.eu/index. ph p?id=10610&parentid=52&themeid=222&h pid=4& 
showdetail=true&bb=1; 
8. http://www.manta.com/c/mx2zsrq/datalink-technologies-gateways-inc;  
9. http://www.manta.com/c/mx4dg23/data lin k-technolog ies-gateways; 
10. http://www.manta.com/cp/mx450tw/555112b2bc36f6db05ded5bf/datalink-_gw1000-
dhp1-df1-to-data-highway-plus-dh-conyerter; 
11. https://fr-fr.facebook.com/datalinkqw1000abeip/;  
12. https://www.facebook.com!permalink.php?id=779277212121133&story fbid=782111 
681837686; 
13. https://vi-vn.facebook.com/datalinkqw1000abeip/; and 
14. https://www.linkedin.com/company/datalink-technologies-group-inc.  
www.robertfleminglawyers.com  
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BETVVEENi. 
EQUUSTEK SOLUTIONS INC., 
ROBERT ANGUS, and CLARMA ENTERPRISES LTD. 
PLAINTIFFS 
AND: 
MORGAN JACK aka MATT GARCIA aka MATT GARCI aka IAN TAYLOR, 
ANDREW CRAWFORD aka DEREK SMYTHE, 
DATA.L1NK TECHNOLOGY GATEWAYS INC., DATALINK 5, DATALINK 6, 
JOHN DOE, DATALINK TECHNOLOGIES GATEWAYS LLC, 
LEE INGRAHAM aka DARREN LANGDON, MIKE BUNKER, 
IGOR CHEIFOT aka JOLIO FERNANDEZ, 
ALEXANDER CHEIFOT aka RANDY SCHTOLZ, 
FRANK GEIGER aka FELIX FERNANDEZ, and 
ALFONSO DOE 
DEFENDANTS 
ORDER MADE AFTER APPLICATION 
BEFORE ) 
) Pi 
65-7N,  the L. 
201-6 
---' day of 
    
ON THE APPLICATION of the plaintiffs without a hearing and on reading the materials 
filed by the plaintiffs; 
THIS COURT ORDERS THAT: 
1. The June 13, 2014 order made in this action be varied to include the additional 
website listed in Schedule "A" to this order; 
2. Within 14 days of the date of this order, Google Inc. cease indexing or 
referencing in search results on its internet search engines the websites listed in 
Schedule "A" to this order, including all subpages and subdirectories of those 
www.robertfleminglawyers.com 
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websites, until the conclusion of the trial of this action or further order of this 
court; and 
3. The June 13, 2014 order made in this action be varied to include a term that 
within 14 days of the date of this order, Google Inc. cease indexing or referencing 
in search results on its Internet search engines the URLs listed in Schedule "B" to 
this order until the conclusion of the trial of this action or further order of this 
court. 
THE FOLLOWING PARTIES APPROVE THE FORM OF THIS ORDER AND CONSENT 
TO EACH OF THE ORDERS, IF ANY, THAT ARE INDICATED ABOVE AS BEING BY 
CONSENT: 
I r 
Signatufe'of lawyer for the plaintiffs 
Joh.n/Zeljkovich 
By the Court. 
Registrar 
wwvv.robertfleminglawyers.com 
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Schedule A 
1. http://wwiv.datalinkcontrollers.datatechqateways.corn/ 
2. http://www.ethemetip-datahighwayplus.com/ 
www.robertfleminglawyers.com 
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1. http://516493715498262299.weeblv.com/about.html 
 
2. http://datalinkow1000.kinIacom 
 
3. http://datalinkow1000.kinjacom/gw1000-abeip-1720388351 
  
4. http://manual.zz.com/doc/2989233/gw1000-user-manual 
 
5. http://wwiv.articlesbase.com/industrial-articles/datalink-technolooies-gw1000-abeip-
low-cost-df1-ethernet-ethernetip-converter-to-allen-brad ley-data-highway-plus-d h-dh-
485-7210304. html  
6. http://www.artipot.com/articles/1853538/datalink-ow1000-df1-ab-ethernet-ethemet-ip-
converter-to-allen-bradleyss-datahighway-plus-dh-dh-485.htm  
7. http://www.docfoc.com/gw1000-abeip 
 
8. http://wvvw.europages.co.uk/DATALINK-TECHNOLOGIES-
GW1000ABEIP/00000004659162-460217001.html 
 
9. http://www.iebmedia.com/index.php?id=10947&parentid=52&themeid=226&hid=576 
  
62&hpic1=4&showdetail=true&sup=57662&bb=&nbb= 
10. http://www.manta.com/cp/mx450tw/5551180059146d3f665d05fb/datalink-gw1000-
abeip-ethernet-ip-to-data-highway-plus-converter 
11. http://wwvv.mfgpapes.com/company/Datalink-Technolopies-in-WASHIN GTON-USA-
10168500/ 
12. http://www.sooperarticles.com/shopping-articles/electronics-articles/datalink-owl 000-
altemative-allen-bradleys-1784-u2dhp-dh-interiace-card-1394191.html  
13. httos://www.facebook.com/datalinkow1000abeipi 
 
14. https://www.facebook.com/datalinkgw1000abeip/posts/782453511803503 
  
15. https://www.facebook.com/datalinkqw1000abeip/posts/889923767723143 
  
vvww.robertfleminglawyers.corn 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA 
BETWEEN: 
EQUUSTEK SOLUTIONS INC., 
ROBERT ANGUS, and CLARMA ENTERPRISES LTD. 
PLAINTIFFS 
AND: 
MORGAN JACK aka MATT GARCIA aka MATT GARCI aka IAN TAYLOR, 
ANDREW CRAWFORD aka DEREK SMYTHE, 
DATALINK TECHNOLOGY GATEWAYS INC., DATALINK 5, DATALINK 6, 
JOHN DOE, DATALINK TECHNOLOGIES GATEWAYS LLC, 
LEE INGRAHAM aka DARREN LANGDON, MIKE BUNKER, 
IGOR CHEIFOT aka JOLIO FERNANDEZ, 
ALEXANDER CHEIFOT aka RANDY SCHTOLZ, 
FRANK GEIGER aka FELIX FERNANDEZ, and 
ALFONSO DOE 
DEFENDANTS 
ORDER MADE AFTER APPLICATION 
BEFORE ) 1 OUDGE OF "THE- (cuct ) Nalrodai  , the _a_ day of ) 2016 
ON THE APPLICATION of the plaintiffs without a hearing and on reading the materials 
filed by the plaintiffs; 
THIS COURT ORDERS THAT: 
1. The June 13, 2014 order made in this action be varied to include a term that 
within 14 days of the date of this order, Google Inc. cease indexing or referencing 
in search results on its internet search engines the URLs listed in Schedule "A" to 
this order until the conclusion of the trial of this action or further order of this 
court. 
BY THE COURT 
ENDORSEMENTS ATTACHED 
 
REGISTRAR 
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THE FOLLOWING PARTIES APPROVE THE FORM OF THIS ORDER AND CONSENT 
TO EACH OF THE ORDERS, IF ANY, THAT ARE INDICATED ABOVE AS BEING BY 
CONSENT: 
Sig re of lawyer for the plaintiffs 
John Zeljkovich 
www.robertfleminglawyers.com 
 
Case 5:17-cv-04207   Document 1   Filed 07/24/17   Page 89 of 143
Schedule A 
1. http://www.cesco.com/b2c/product/617546  
2. http://www.iebmedia.com/wireless.php?id=11042&parentid=52&themeid=225  
&hid=57662&hpid=4&showdetail=true&sup=57662&bb=&nbb= 
3. https://www.facebook.com/datalinkgw1000abeip/posts/782111681837686  
4. http://datalinkgw1000.kinja.com/datalink-gw1000-multi-protocol-converter-
interfacing-n-1723096976 
5. http://www.articlesbase.com/industrial-articles/datalink-technologies-gw1000-
abeip-low-cost-df1-ethemet-ethernetip-converter-to-allen-bradley-data-
highway-plus-dh-dh-485-7210304.html  
www.robertfleminglawyers.com  
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SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 
 
CITATION: Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc., 
2017 SCC 34 
APPEAL HEARD: December 6, 2016 
JUDGMENT RENDERED: June 28, 2017 
DOCKET: 36602 
 
BETWEEN: 
Google Inc. 
Appellant 
 
and 
 
Equustek Solutions Inc., Robert Angus and Clarma Enterprises Inc. 
Respondents 
 
- and - 
 
Attorney General of Canada, Attorney General of Ontario, Canadian Civil 
Liberties Association, OpenMedia Engagement Network, Reporters Committee 
for Freedom of the Press, American Society of News Editors, Association of 
Alternative Newsmedia, The Center for Investigative Reporting, Dow Jones & 
Company, Inc., First Amendment Coalition, First Look Media Works, Inc., New 
England First Amendment Coalition, News Media Alliance (formerly known as 
Newspaper Association of America), AOL Inc., California Newspaper Publishers 
Association, The Associated Press, The Investigative Reporting Workshop at 
American University, Online News Association, Society of Professional 
Journalists, Human Rights Watch, ARTICLE 19, Open Net (Korea), Software 
Freedom Law Centre, Center for Technology and Society, Wikimedia 
Foundation, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, International Federation of the Phonographic Industry, Music 
Canada, Canadian Publishers’ Council, Association of Canadian Publishers, 
International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers, 
International Confederation of Music Publishers, Worldwide Independent 
Network and International Federation of Film Producers Associations 
Interveners 
 
 
CORAM: McLachlin C.J. and Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Wagner, Gascon, Côté, 
Brown and Rowe JJ. 
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT: 
(paras. 1 to 54) 
Abella J. (McLachlin C.J. and Moldaver, Karakatsanis, 
Wagner, Gascon and Brown JJ. concurring) 
 
JOINT DISSENTING REASONS: 
(paras. 55 to 82) 
Côté and Rowe JJ. 
 
 
NOTE: This document is subject to editorial revision before its reproduction in final 
form in the Canada Supreme Court Reports. 
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GOOGLE INC. v. EQUUSTEK SOLUTIONS INC. 
Google Inc. Appellant 
v. 
Equustek Solutions Inc.,  
Robert Angus and Clarma Enterprises Inc. Respondents 
and 
Attorney General of Canada, Attorney General of Ontario,  
Canadian Civil Liberties Association, OpenMedia  
Engagement Network, Reporters Committee for  
Freedom of the Press, American Society of News Editors,  
Association of Alternative Newsmedia, The Center for  
Investigative Reporting, Dow Jones & Company, Inc.,  
First Amendment Coalition, First Look Media Works, Inc., 
New England First Amendment Coalition, News Media  
Alliance (formerly known as Newspaper Association of America),  
AOL Inc., California Newspaper Publishers Association,  
The Associated Press, The Investigative Reporting  
Workshop at American University, Online News Association,  
Society of Professional Journalists, Human Rights Watch,  
ARTICLE 19, Open Net (Korea), Software Freedom Law Centre,  
Center for Technology and Society, Wikimedia Foundation,  
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association,  
Electronic Frontier Foundation, International Federation  
of the Phonographic Industry, Music Canada,  
Canadian Publishers’ Council, Association of Canadian Publishers,  
International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers, 
International Confederation of Music Publishers,  
Worldwide Independent Network and International  
Federation of Film Producers Associations  Interveners 
Indexed as: Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc. 
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2017 SCC 34 
File No.: 36602. 
2016: December 6; 2017: June 28. 
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Wagner, Gascon, Côté, 
Brown and Rowe JJ. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA 
 Injunctions — Interlocutory injunction — Non-party — Technology 
company bringing action against distributor for unlawful use and sale of its 
intellectual property through Internet — Company granted interlocutory injunction 
against Google, a non-party to underlying action, to cease indexing or referencing 
certain search results on its Internet search engine — Whether Google can be 
ordered, pending trial of action, to globally de-index websites of distributor which, in 
breach of several court orders, is using those websites to unlawfully sell intellectual 
property of another company — Whether Supreme Court of British Columbia had 
jurisdiction to grant injunction with extraterritorial effect — Whether, if it did, it was 
just and equitable to do so.  
 E is a small technology company in British Columbia that launched an 
action against D. E claimed that D, while acting as a distributor of E’s products, 
began to re-label one of the products and pass it off as its own. D also acquired 
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confidential information and trade secrets belonging to E, using them to design and 
manufacture a competing product. D filed statements of defence disputing E’s claims, 
but eventually abandoned the proceedings and left the province. Some of D’s 
statements of defence were subsequently struck.  
 Despite court orders prohibiting the sale of inventory and the use of E’s 
intellectual property, D continues to carry on its business from an unknown location, 
selling its impugned product on its websites to customers all over the world. E 
approached Google and requested that it de-index D’s websites. Google refused. E 
then brought court proceedings, seeking an order requiring Google to do so. Google 
asked E to obtain a court order prohibiting D from carrying on business on the 
Internet saying it would comply with such an order by removing specific webpages.  
 An injunction was issued by the Supreme Court of British Columbia 
ordering D to cease operating or carrying on business through any website. Between 
December 2012 and January 2013, Google advised E that it had de-indexed 345 
specific webpages associated with D. It did not, however, de-index all of D’s 
websites. De-indexing webpages but not entire websites proved to be ineffective since 
D simply moved the objectionable content to new pages within its websites, 
circumventing the court orders. Moreover, Google had limited the de-indexing to 
searches conducted on google.ca. E therefore obtained an interlocutory injunction to 
enjoin Google from displaying any part of D’s websites on any of its search results 
worldwide. The Court of Appeal for British Columbia dismissed Google’s appeal. 
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 Held (Côté and Rowe JJ. dissenting): The appeal is dismissed and the 
worldwide interlocutory injunction against Google is upheld.  
 Per McLachlin C.J. and Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Wagner, 
Gascon and Brown JJ.: The issue is whether Google can be ordered, pending a trial, 
to globally de-index D’s websites which, in breach of several court orders, is using 
those websites to unlawfully sell the intellectual property of another company. 
 The decision to grant an interlocutory injunction is a discretionary one 
and entitled to a high degree of deference. Interlocutory injunctions are equitable 
remedies that seek to ensure that the subject matter of the litigation will be preserved 
so that effective relief will be available when the case is ultimately heard on the 
merits. Their character as “interlocutory” is not dependent on their duration pending 
trial. Ultimately, the question is whether granting the injunction is just and equitable 
in the circumstances of the case. 
 The test for determining whether the court should exercise its discretion 
to grant an interlocutory injunction against Google has been met in this case: there is 
a serious issue to be tried; E is suffering irreparable harm as a result of D’s ongoing 
sale of its competing product through the Internet; and the balance of convenience is 
in favour of granting the order sought.  
 Google does not dispute that there is a serious claim, or that E is suffering 
irreparable harm which it is inadvertently facilitating through its search engine. Nor 
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does it suggest that it would be inconvenienced in any material way, or would incur 
any significant expense, in de-indexing D’s websites. Its arguments are that the 
injunction is not necessary to prevent irreparable harm to E and is not effective; that 
as a non-party it should be immune from the injunction; that there is no necessity for 
the extraterritorial reach of the order; and that there are freedom of expression 
concerns that should have tipped the balance against granting the order.  
 Injunctive relief can be ordered against someone who is not a party to the 
underlying lawsuit. When non-parties are so involved in the wrongful acts of others 
that they facilitate the harm, even if they themselves are not guilty of wrongdoing, 
they can be subject to interlocutory injunctions. It is common ground that D was 
unable to carry on business in a commercially viable way without its websites 
appearing on Google. The injunction in this case flows from the necessity of Google’s 
assistance to prevent the facilitation of D’s ability to defy court orders and do 
irreparable harm to E. Without the injunctive relief, it was clear that Google would 
continue to facilitate that ongoing harm.  
 Where it is necessary to ensure the injunction’s effectiveness, a court can 
grant an injunction enjoining conduct anywhere in the world. The problem in this 
case is occurring online and globally. The Internet has no borders — its natural 
habitat is global. The only way to ensure that the interlocutory injunction attained its 
objective was to have it apply where Google operates — globally. If the injunction 
were restricted to Canada alone or to google.ca, the remedy would be deprived of its 
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intended ability to prevent irreparable harm, since purchasers outside Canada could 
easily continue purchasing from D’s websites, and Canadian purchasers could find 
D’s websites even if those websites were de-indexed on google.ca.  
 Google’s argument that a global injunction violates international comity 
because it is possible that the order could not have been obtained in a foreign 
jurisdiction, or that to comply with it would result in Google violating the laws of that 
jurisdiction, is theoretical. If Google has evidence that complying with such an 
injunction would require it to violate the laws of another jurisdiction, including 
interfering with freedom of expression, it is always free to apply to the British 
Columbia courts to vary the interlocutory order accordingly. To date, Google has 
made no such application. In the absence of an evidentiary foundation, and given 
Google’s right to seek a rectifying order, it is not equitable to deny E the 
extraterritorial scope it needs to make the remedy effective, or even to put the onus on 
it to demonstrate, country by country, where such an order is legally permissible. 
 D and its representatives have ignored all previous court orders made 
against them, have left British Columbia, and continue to operate their business from 
unknown locations outside Canada. E has made efforts to locate D with limited 
success. D is only able to survive — at the expense of E’s survival — on Google’s 
search engine which directs potential customers to D’s websites. This makes Google 
the determinative player in allowing the harm to occur. On balance, since the 
world-wide injunction is the only effective way to mitigate the harm to E pending the 
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trial, the only way, in fact, to preserve E itself pending the resolution of the 
underlying litigation, and since any countervailing harm to Google is minimal to 
non-existent, the interlocutory injunction should be upheld. 
 Per Côté and Rowe JJ. (dissenting): While the court had jurisdiction to 
issue the injunctive order against Google, it should have refrained from doing so. 
Numerous factors affecting the grant of an injunction strongly favour judicial restraint 
in this case.  
 First, the Google Order in effect amounts to a final determination of the 
action because it removes any potential benefit from proceeding to trial. In its original 
underlying claim, E sought injunctions modifying the way D carries out its website 
business. E has been given more injunctive relief than it sought in its originating 
claim, including requiring D to cease website business altogether. Little incentive 
remains for E to return to court to seek a lesser injunctive remedy. This is evidenced 
by E’s choice to not seek default judgment during the roughly five years which have 
passed since it was given leave to do so. The Google Order provides E with more 
equitable relief than it sought against D and gives E an additional remedy that is final 
in nature. The order against Google, while interlocutory in form, is final in effect. The 
test for interlocutory injunctions does not apply to an order that is effectively final. In 
these circumstances, an extensive review of the merits of this case was therefore 
required but was not carried out by the court below, contrary to caselaw. The Google 
Order does not meet the test for a permanent injunction. Although E’s claims were 
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supported by a good prima facie case, it was not established that D designed and sold 
counterfeit versions of E’s product, or that this resulted in trademark infringement 
and unlawful appropriation of trade secrets.  
 Second, Google is a non-party to the proceedings between E and D. E 
alleged that Google’s search engine was facilitating D’s ongoing breach by leading 
customers to D’s websites. However, the prior order that required D to cease carrying 
on business through any website was breached as soon as D established a website to 
conduct its business, regardless of how visible that website might be through Google 
searches. Google did not aid or abet the doing of the prohibited act.  
 Third, the Google Order is mandatory and requires ongoing modification 
and supervision because D is launching new websites to replace de-listed ones. 
Courts should avoid granting injunctions that require such cumbersome 
court-supervised updating.  
 Furthermore, the Google Order has not been shown to be effective in 
making D cease operating or carrying on business through any website. Moreover, the 
Google Order does not assist E in modifying D’s websites, as E sought in its 
originating claim for injunctive relief. The most that can be said is the Google Order 
might reduce the harm to E. But it has not been shown that the Google Order is 
effective in doing so. D’s websites can be found using other search engines, links 
from other sites, bookmarks, email, social media, printed material, word-of-mouth, or 
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other indirect means. D’s websites are open for business on the Internet whether 
Google searches list them or not.  
 Finally, there are alternative remedies available to E. E sought a 
world-wide Mareva injunction to freeze D’s assets in France, but the Court of Appeal 
for British Columbia urged E to pursue a remedy in French courts. There is no reason 
why E cannot do what the Court of Appeal urged it to do. E could also pursue 
injunctive relief against the ISP providers. In addition, E could initiate contempt 
proceedings in France or in any other jurisdiction with a link to the illegal websites. 
Therefore, the Google Order ought not to have been granted.  
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The judgment of McLachlin C.J. and Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Wagner, 
Gascon and Brown JJ. was delivered by 
 
 ABELLA J. —  
[1] The issue in this appeal is whether Google can be ordered, pending a trial, 
to globally de-index the websites of a company which, in breach of several court 
orders, is using those websites to unlawfully sell the intellectual property of another 
company. The answer turns on classic interlocutory injunction jurisprudence: is there 
a serious issue to be tried; would irreparable harm result if the injunction were not 
granted; and does the balance of convenience favour granting or refusing the 
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injunction. Ultimately, the question is whether granting the injunction would be just 
and equitable in all the circumstances of the case.  
Background 
[2] Equustek Solutions Inc. is a small technology company in British 
Columbia. It manufactures networking devices that allow complex industrial 
equipment made by one manufacturer to communicate with complex industrial 
equipment made by another manufacturer.  
[3] The underlying action between Equustek and the Datalink defendants 
(Morgan Jack, Datalink Technology Gateways Inc., and Datalink Technologies 
Gateways LLC – “Datalink”) was launched by Equustek on April 12, 2011. It 
claimed that Datalink, while acting as a distributor of Equustek’s products, began to 
re-label one of the products and pass it off as its own. Datalink also acquired 
confidential information and trade secrets belonging to Equustek, using them to 
design and manufacture a competing product, the GW1000. Any orders for 
Equustek’s product were filled with the GW1000. When Equustek discovered this in 
2011, it terminated the distribution agreement it had with Datalink and demanded that 
Datalink delete all references to Equustek’s products and trademarks on its websites. 
[4] The Datalink defendants filed statements of defence disputing Equustek’s 
claims.  
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[5] On September 23, 2011, Leask J. granted an injunction ordering Datalink 
to return to Equustek any source codes, board schematics, and any other 
documentation it may have had in its possession that belonged to Equustek. The court 
also prohibited Datalink from referring to Equustek or any of Equustek’s products on 
its websites. It ordered Datalink to post a statement on its websites informing 
customers that Datalink was no longer a distributor of Equustek products and 
directing customers interested in Equustek’s products to Equustek’s website. In 
addition, Datalink was ordered to give Equustek a list of customers who had ordered 
an Equustek product from Datalink.  
[6] On March 21, 2012, Fenlon J. found that Datalink had not properly 
complied with this order and directed it to produce a new customer list and make 
certain changes to the notices on their websites.  
[7] Datalink abandoned the proceedings and left the jurisdiction without 
producing any documents or complying with any of the orders. Some of Datalink’s 
statements of defence were subsequently struck.  
[8] On July 26, 2012, Punnett J. granted a Mareva injunction freezing 
Datalink’s worldwide assets, including its entire product inventory. He found that 
Datalink had incorporated “a myriad of shell corporations in different jurisdictions”, 
continued to sell the impugned product, reduced prices to attract more customers, and 
was offering additional services that Equustek claimed disclosed more of its trade 
secrets. He concluded that Equustek would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction 
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were not granted, and that, on the balance of convenience and due to a real risk of the 
dissipation of assets, it was just and equitable to grant the injunction against Datalink.   
[9] On August 3, 2012, Fenlon J. granted another interlocutory injunction 
prohibiting Datalink from dealing with broader classes of intellectual property, 
including “any use of whole categories of documents and information that lie at the 
heart of any business of a kind engaged in by both parties”. She noted that Equustek’s 
“earnings ha[d] fallen drastically since [Datalink] began [its] impugned activities” 
and concluded that “the effect of permitting [Datalink] to carry on [its] business 
[would] also cause irreparable harm to [Equustek]”.  
[10] On September 26, 2012, Equustek brought an application to have 
Datalink and its principal, Morgan Jack, found in contempt. No one appeared on 
behalf of Datalink. Groves J. issued a warrant for Morgan Jack’s arrest. It remains 
outstanding.  
[11] Despite the court orders prohibiting the sale of inventory and the use of 
Equustek’s intellectual property, Datalink continues to carry on its business from an 
unknown location, selling its impugned product on its websites to customers all over 
the world.  
[12] Not knowing where Datalink or its suppliers were, and finding itself 
unable to have the websites removed by the websites’ hosting companies, Equustek 
approached Google in September 2012 and requested that it de-index the Datalink 
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websites. Google refused. Equustek then brought court proceedings seeking an order 
requiring Google to do so. 
[13] When it was served with the application materials, Google asked 
Equustek to obtain a court order prohibiting Datalink from carrying on business on 
the Internet. Google told Equustek it would comply with such an order by removing 
specific webpages. Pursuant to its internal policy, Google only voluntarily de-indexes 
individual webpages, not entire websites. Equustek agreed to try this approach. 
[14] On December 13, 2012, Equustek appeared in court with Google. An 
injunction was issued by Tindale J. ordering Datalink to “cease operating or carrying 
on business through any website”. Between December 2012 and January 2013, 
Google advised Equustek that it had de-indexed 345 specific webpages associated 
with Datalink. It did not, however, de-index all of the Datalink websites.  
[15] Equustek soon discovered that de-indexing webpages but not entire 
websites was ineffective since Datalink simply moved the objectionable content to 
new pages within its websites, circumventing the court orders.  
[16] Google had limited the de-indexing to those searches that were conducted 
on google.ca. Google’s search engine operates through dedicated websites all over the 
world. The Internet search services are free, but Google earns money by selling 
advertising space on the webpages that display search results. Internet users with 
Canadian Internet Protocol addresses are directed to “google.ca” when performing 
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online searches. But users can also access different Google websites directed at other 
countries by using the specific Uniform Resource Locator, or URL, for those sites. 
That means that someone in Vancouver, for example, can access the Google search 
engine as though he or she were in another country simply by typing in that country’s 
Google URL. Potential Canadian customers could, as a result, find Datalink’s 
websites even if they were blocked on google.ca. Given that the majority of the sales 
of Datalink’s GW1000 were to purchasers outside of Canada, Google’s de-indexing 
did not have the necessary protective effect.  
[17] Equustek therefore sought an interlocutory injunction to enjoin Google 
from displaying any part of the Datalink websites on any of its search results 
worldwide. Fenlon J. granted the order (374 D.L.R. (4th) 537 (B.C.S.C.)). The 
operative part states: 
Within 14 days of the date of this order, Google Inc. is to cease indexing 
or referencing in search results on its internet search engines the 
[Datalink] websites …, including all of the subpages and subdirectories 
of the listed websites, until the conclusion of the trial of this action or 
further order of this court. [Emphasis added] 
[18] Fenlon J. noted that Google controls between 70-75 percent of the global 
searches on the Internet and that Datalink’s ability to sell its counterfeit product is, in 
large part, contingent on customers being able to locate its websites through the use 
of Google’s search engine. Only by preventing potential customers from accessing 
the Datalink websites, could Equustek be protected. Otherwise, Datalink would be 
able to continue selling its product online and the damages Equustek would suffer 
would not be recoverable at the end of the lawsuit.  
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[19] Fenlon J. concluded that this irreparable harm was being facilitated 
through Google’s search engine; that Equustek had no alternative but to require 
Google to de-index the websites; that Google would not be inconvenienced; and that, 
for the order to be effective, the Datalink websites had to be prevented from being 
displayed on all of Google’s search results, not just google.ca. As she said:  
On the record before me it appears that to be effective, even within 
Canada, Google must block search results on all of its websites. 
Furthermore, [Datalink’s] sales originate primarily in other countries, so 
the Court’s process cannot be protected unless the injunction ensures that 
searchers from any jurisdiction do not find [Datalink’s] websites.1  
[20] The Court of Appeal of British Columbia dismissed Google’s appeal (386 
D.L.R. (4th) 224). Groberman J.A. accepted Fenlon J.’s conclusion that she had in 
personam jurisdiction over Google and could therefore make an order with 
extraterritorial effect. He also agreed that courts of inherent jurisdiction could grant 
equitable relief against non-parties. Since ordering an interlocutory injunction against 
Google was the only practical way to prevent Datalink from flouting the court’s 
several orders, and since there were no identifiable countervailing comity or freedom 
of expression concerns that would prevent such an order from being granted, he 
upheld the interlocutory injunction.  
[21] For the following reasons, I agree with Fenlon J. and Groberman J.A. that 
the test for granting an interlocutory injunction against Google has been met in this 
case. 
                                                 
1
 Para. 148. 
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Analysis 
[22] The decision to grant an interlocutory injunction is a discretionary one 
and entitled to a high degree of deference (Manitoba (Attorney General) v. 
Metropolitan Stores Ltd., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 110, at pp. 155-56). In this case, I see no 
reason to interfere.  
[23] Injunctions are equitable remedies. “The powers of courts with equitable 
jurisdiction to grant injunctions are, subject to any relevant statutory restrictions, 
unlimited” (Ian Spry, The Principles of Equitable Remedies (9th ed. 2014), at p. 333).  
Robert Sharpe notes that “[t]he injunction is a flexible and drastic remedy. 
Injunctions are not restricted to any area of substantive law and are readily 
enforceable through the court’s contempt power” (Injunctions and Specific 
Performance (loose-leaf ed.), at para. 2.10). 
[24] An interlocutory injunction is normally enforceable until trial or some 
other determination of the action. Interlocutory injunctions seek to ensure that the 
subject matter of the litigation will be “preserved” so that effective relief will be 
available when the case is ultimately heard on the merits (Jeffrey Berryman, The Law 
of Equitable Remedies (2nd ed. 2013), at pp. 24-25). Their character as 
“interlocutory” is not dependent on their duration pending trial. 
[25] RJR—MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 
311, sets out a three-part test for determining whether a court should exercise its 
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discretion to grant an interlocutory injunction: is there a serious issue to be tried; 
would the person applying for the injunction suffer irreparable harm if the injunction 
were not granted; and is the balance of convenience in favour of granting the 
interlocutory injunction or denying it. The fundamental question is whether the 
granting of an injunction is just and equitable in all of the circumstances of the case. 
This will necessarily be context-specific. 
[26] Google does not dispute that there is a serious claim. Nor does it dispute 
that Equustek is suffering irreparable harm as a result of Datalink’s ongoing sale of 
the GW1000 through the Internet. And it acknowledges, as Fenlon J. found, that it 
inadvertently facilitates the harm through its search engine which leads purchasers 
directly to the Datalink websites.  
[27] Google argues, however, that the injunction issued against it is not 
necessary to prevent that irreparable harm, and that it is not effective in so doing.  
Moreover, it argues that as a non-party, it should be immune from the injunction. As 
for the balance of convenience, it challenges the propriety and necessity of the 
extraterritorial reach of such an order, and raises freedom of expression concerns that 
it says should have tipped the balance against granting the order. These arguments go 
both to whether the Supreme Court of British Columbia had jurisdiction to grant the 
injunction and whether, if it did, it was just and equitable to do so in this case.  
[28] Google’s first argument is, in essence, that non-parties cannot be the 
subject of an interlocutory injunction. With respect, this is contrary to the 
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jurisprudence. Not only can injunctive relief be ordered against someone who is not a 
party to the underlying lawsuit, the contours of the test are not changed. As this Court 
said in MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson [1996] 2 S.C.R. 1048, injunctions may be 
issued ‘“in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just or convenient that the 
order should be made . . . on terms and conditions the court thinks just”’ (para. 15, 
citing s. 36 of the Law and Equity Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 224). MacMillan Bloedel 
involved a logging company seeking to restrain protesters from blocking roads. The 
company obtained an interlocutory injunction prohibiting not only specifically named 
individuals, but also “John Doe, Jane Doe and Persons Unknown” and “all persons 
having notice of th[e] order” from engaging in conduct which interfered with its 
operations at specific locations. In upholding the injunction, McLachlin J. noted that 
[i]t may be confidently asserted . . . that both English and Canadian 
authorities support the view that non-parties are bound by injunctions: if 
non-parties violate injunctions, they are subject to conviction and 
punishment for contempt of court. The courts have jurisdiction to grant 
interim injunctions which all people, on pain of contempt, must obey. 
[Emphasis added; para. 31] 
 
See also Berryman, at pp. 57-60; Sharpe, at paras. 6.260 to 6.265.  
[29] In other words, where a non-party violates a court order, there is a 
principled basis for treating the non-party as if it had been bound by the order. The 
non-party’s obligation arises “not because [it] is bound by the injunction by being a 
party to the cause, but because [it] is conducting [itself] so as to obstruct the course of 
justice” (MacMillan Bloedel, at para. 27, quoting Seaward v. Paterson, [1897] 1 Ch. 
545 (C.A.), at p. 555). 
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[30] The pragmatism and necessity of such an approach was concisely 
explained by Fenlon J. in the case before us when she offered the following example: 
 . . . a non-party corporation that warehouses and ships goods for a 
defendant manufacturing company might be ordered on an interim 
injunction to freeze the defendants’ goods and refrain from shipping 
them. That injunction could affect orders received from customers around 
the world. Could it sensibly be argued that the Court could not grant the 
injunction because it would have effects worldwide? The impact of an 
injunction on strangers to the suit or the order itself is a valid 
consideration in deciding whether to exercise the Court’s jurisdiction to 
grant an injunction. It does not, however, affect the Court’s authority to 
make such an order.2 
[31] Norwich orders are analogous and can also be used to compel non-parties 
to disclose information or documents in their possession required by a claimant 
(Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Customs and Excise Commissioners, [1974] A.C. 133 
(H.L.), at p. 175). Norwich orders have increasingly been used in the online context 
by plaintiffs who allege that they are being anonymously defamed or defrauded and 
seek orders against Internet service providers to disclose the identity of the 
perpetrator (York University v. Bell Canada Enterprises (2009), 311 D.L.R. (4th) 755 
(Ont. S.C.J.)).  Norwich disclosure may be ordered against non-parties who are not 
themselves guilty of wrongdoing, but who are so involved in the wrongful acts of 
others that they facilitate the harm. In Norwich, this was characterized as a duty to 
assist the person wronged (p. 175; Cartier International AG v. British Sky 
Broadcasting Ltd., [2017], 1 All E.R. 700 (C.A.), at para. 53). Norwich supplies a 
principled rationale for granting injunctions against non-parties who facilitate 
                                                 
2
 Para. 147. 
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wrongdoing (see Cartier, at paras. 51-55; and Warner-Lambert Co. v. Actavis Group 
PTC EHF, 144 B.M.L.R. 194 (Ch.)). 
[32] This approach was applied in Cartier, where the Court of Appeal of 
England and Wales held that injunctive relief could be awarded against five non-party 
Internet service providers who had not engaged in, and were not accused of any 
wrongful act. The Internet service providers were ordered to block the ability of their 
customers to access certain websites in order to avoid facilitating infringements of the 
plaintiff’s trademarks. (See also Jaani Riordan, The Liability of Internet 
Intermediaries (2016), at pp. 412 and 498-99.) 
[33] The same logic underlies Mareva injunctions, which can also be issued 
against non-parties. Mareva injunctions are used to freeze assets in order to prevent 
their dissipation pending the conclusion of a trial or action (Mareva Compania 
Naviera SA v. International Bulkcarriers SA, [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 509 (C.A.); 
Aetna Financial Services Ltd. v. Feigelman, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 2). A Mareva injunction 
that requires a defendant not to dissipate his or her assets sometimes requires the 
assistance of a non-party, which in turn can result in an injunction against the non-
party if it is just and equitable to do so (Stephen Pitel and Andrew Valentine, “The 
Evolution of the Extra-territorial Mareva Injunction in Canada: Three Issues” (2006), 
2 J. Priv. Int’l L. 339, at p. 370; Vaughan Black and Edward Babin, “Mareva 
Injunctions in Canada: Territorial Aspects” (1997), 28 Can. Bus. L.J. 430, at pp. 452-
53; Berryman, at pp. 128-31). Banks and other financial institutions have, as a result, 
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been bound by Mareva injunctions even when they are not a party to an underlying 
action.  
[34] To preserve Equustek’s rights pending the outcome of the litigation, 
Tindale J.’s order of December 13, 2012 required Datalink to cease carrying on 
business through the Internet. Google had requested and participated in Equustek’s 
obtaining this order, and offered to comply with it voluntarily. It is common ground 
that Datalink was unable to carry on business in a commercially viable way unless its 
websites were in Google’s search results. In the absence of de-indexing these 
websites, as Fenlon J. specifically found, Google was facilitating Datalink’s breach of 
Tindale J.’s order by enabling it to continue carrying on business through the Internet. 
By the time Fenlon J. granted the injunction against Google, Google was aware that 
in not de-indexing Datalink’s websites, it was facilitating Datalink’s ongoing breach 
of Tindale J.’s order, the purpose of which was to prevent irreparable harm to 
Equustek. 
[35] Much like a Norwich order or a Mareva injunction against a non-party, 
the interlocutory injunction in this case flows from the necessity of Google’s 
assistance in order to prevent the facilitation of Datalink’s ability to defy court orders 
and do irreparable harm to Equustek. Without the injunctive relief, it was clear that 
Google would continue to facilitate that ongoing harm. 
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[36] Google’s next argument is the impropriety of issuing an interlocutory 
injunction with extraterritorial effect. But this too contradicts the existing 
jurisprudence.  
[37] The British Columbia courts in these proceedings concluded that because 
Google carried on business in the province through its advertising and search 
operations, this was sufficient to establish the existence of in personam and territorial 
jurisdiction. Google does not challenge those findings. It challenges instead the global 
reach of the resulting order. Google suggests that if any injunction is to be granted, it 
should be limited to Canada (or google.ca) alone. 
[38] When a court has in personam jurisdiction, and where it is necessary to 
ensure the injunction’s effectiveness, it can grant an injunction enjoining that person’s 
conduct anywhere in the world. (See Impulsora Turistica de Occidente, S.A. de C.V. 
v. Transat Tours Canada Inc., [2007] 1 S.C.R. 867, at para. 6; Berryman, at p. 20; 
Pitel and Valentine, at p. 389; Sharpe, at para. 1.1190; Spry, at p. 37.) Mareva 
injunctions have been granted with worldwide effect when it was found to be 
necessary to ensure their effectiveness. (See Mooney v. Orr (1994), 98 B.C.L.R. (2d) 
318 (S.C.); Berryman, at pp. 20 and 136; Babanaft International Co. S.A. v. Bassatne, 
[1990] 1 Ch. 13 (C.A.); Republic of Haiti v. Duvalier, [1990] 1 Q.B. 202 (C.A.); 
Derby & Co. v. Weldon, [1990] 1 Ch. 48 (C.A.); and Derby & Co. v. Weldon (Nos. 3 
and 4) [1990] 1 Ch. 65 (C.A.); Sharpe, at paras. 1.1190 to 1.1220.) 
[39] Groberman J.A. pointed to the international support for this approach:  
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 I note that the courts of many other jurisdictions have found it 
necessary, in the context of orders against Internet abuses, to pronounce 
orders that have international effects. Several such cases are cited in the 
arguments of [International Federation of Film Producers Associations 
and International Federation of the Phonographic Industry], including 
APC v. Auchan Telecom, 11/60013, Judgment (28 November 2013) 
(Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris); McKeogh v. Doe (Irish High 
Court, case no. 20121254P); Mosley v. Google, 11/07970, Judgment (6 
November 2013) (Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris); Max Mosley v. 
Google (see “Case Law, Hamburg District Court: Max Mosley v. Google 
Inc. online: Inform’s Blog https://inforrm.wordpress.com/ 
2014/02/05/case-law-hamburg-district-court-max-mosley-v-google-inc-
google-go-down-again-this-time-in-hamburg-dominic-crossley/) and ECJ 
Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos, Mario Costeja González, C-131/12 [2014], CURIA.3  
[40] Fenlon J. explained why Equustek’s request that the order have 
worldwide effect was necessary as follows:  
 The majority of GW1000 sales occur outside Canada. Thus, quite apart 
from the practical problem of endless website iterations, the option 
Google proposes is not equivalent to the order now sought which would 
compel Google to remove the [Datalink] websites from all search results 
generated by any of Google’s websites worldwide. I therefore conclude 
that [Equustek does] not have an out-of-court remedy available to [it].4 
 
. . .  
 
 . . . to be effective, even within Canada, Google must block search 
results on all of its websites.5 
As a result, to ensure that Google did not facilitate Datalink’s breach of court orders 
whose purposes were to prevent irreparable harm to Equustek, she concluded that the 
injunction had to have worldwide effect.  
                                                 
3
 Para. 95. 
4
 Para. 76. 
5
 Para. 148. 
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[41] I agree. The problem in this case is occurring online and globally. The 
Internet has no borders — its natural habitat is global. The only way to ensure that the 
interlocutory injunction attained its objective was to have it apply where Google 
operates — globally. As Fenlon J. found, the majority of Datalink’s sales take place 
outside Canada. If the injunction were restricted to Canada alone or to google.ca, as 
Google suggests it should have been, the remedy would be deprived of its intended 
ability to prevent irreparable harm. Purchasers outside Canada could easily continue 
purchasing from Datalink’s websites, and Canadian purchasers could easily find 
Datalink’s websites even if those websites were de-indexed on google.ca. Google 
would still be facilitating Datalink’s breach of the court’s order which had prohibited 
it from carrying on business on the Internet. There is no equity in ordering an 
interlocutory injunction which has no realistic prospect of preventing irreparable 
harm.  
[42] The interlocutory injunction in this case is necessary to prevent the 
irreparable harm that flows from Datalink carrying on business on the Internet, a 
business which would be commercially impossible without Google’s facilitation. The 
order targets Datalink’s websites — the list of which has been updated as Datalink 
has sought to thwart the injunction — and prevents them from being displayed where 
they do the most harm: on Google’s global search results.  
[43] Nor does the injunction’s worldwide effect tip the balance of convenience 
in Google’s favour. The order does not require that Google take any steps around the 
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world, it requires it to take steps only where its search engine is controlled. This is 
something Google has acknowledged it can do — and does — with relative ease. 
There is therefore no harm to Google which can be placed on its “inconvenience” 
scale arising from the global reach of the order.  
[44] Google’s argument that a global injunction violates international comity 
because it is possible that the order could not have been obtained in a foreign 
jurisdiction, or that to comply with it would result in Google violating the laws of that 
jurisdiction is, with respect, theoretical. As Fenlon J. noted, “Google acknowledges 
that most countries will likely recognize intellectual property rights and view the 
selling of pirated products as a legal wrong”.6  
[45] And while it is always important to pay respectful attention to freedom of 
expression concerns, particularly when dealing with the core values of another 
country, I do not see freedom of expression issues being engaged in any way that tips 
the balance of convenience towards Google in this case. As Groberman J.A. 
concluded: 
 In the case before us, there is no realistic assertion that the judge’s 
order will offend the sensibilities of any other nation. It has not been 
suggested that the order prohibiting the defendants from advertising 
wares that violate the intellectual property rights of the plaintiffs offends 
the core values of any nation. The order made against Google is a very 
limited ancillary order designed to ensure that the plaintiffs’ core rights 
are respected.  
 
                                                 
6
 Para. 144. 
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 . . . the order in this case is an interlocutory one, and one that can be 
varied by the court. In the unlikely event that any jurisdiction finds the 
order offensive to its core values, an application could be made to the 
court to modify the order so as to avoid the problem.7 
[46] If Google has evidence that complying with such an injunction would 
require it to violate the laws of another jurisdiction, including interfering with 
freedom of expression, it is always free to apply to the British Columbia courts to 
vary the interlocutory order accordingly. To date, Google has made no such 
application. 
[47] In the absence of an evidentiary foundation, and given Google’s right to 
seek a rectifying order, it hardly seems equitable to deny Equustek the extraterritorial 
scope it needs to make the remedy effective, or even to put the onus on it to 
demonstrate, country by country, where such an order is legally permissible. We are 
dealing with the Internet after all, and the balance of convenience test has to take full 
account of its inevitable extraterritorial reach when injunctive relief is being sought 
against an entity like Google. 
[48] This is not an order to remove speech that, on its face, engages freedom 
of expression values, it is an order to de-index websites that are in violation of several 
court orders. We have not, to date, accepted that freedom of expression requires the 
facilitation of the unlawful sale of goods.  
                                                 
7
 Paras. 93-94. 
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[49] And I have trouble seeing how this interferes with what Google refers to 
as its content neutral character. The injunction does not require Google to monitor 
content on the Internet, nor is it a finding of any sort of liability against Google for 
facilitating access to the impugned websites. As for the balance of convenience, the 
only obligation the interlocutory injunction creates is for Google to de-index the 
Datalink websites. The order is, as Fenlon J. observed, “only a slight expansion on the 
removal of individual URLs, which Google agreed to do voluntarily”.8 Even if it 
could be said that the injunction engages freedom of expression issues, this is far 
outweighed by the need to prevent the irreparable harm that would result from 
Google’s facilitating Datalink’s breach of court orders. 
[50] Google did not suggest that it would be inconvenienced in any material 
way, or would incur any significant expense, in de-indexing the Datalink websites. It 
acknowledges, fairly, that it can, and often does, exactly what is being asked of it in 
this case, that is, alter search results. It does so to avoid generating links to child 
pornography and websites containing “hate speech”. It also complies with notices it 
receives under the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 
Stat. 2680 (1998) to de-index content from its search results that allegedly infringes 
copyright, and removes websites that are subject to court orders. 
[51] As for the argument that this will turn into a permanent injunction, the 
length of an interlocutory injunction does not, by itself, convert its character from a 
                                                 
8
 Para. 137. 
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temporary to a permanent one. As previously noted, the order requires that the 
injunction be in place “until the conclusion of the trial of this action or further order 
of this court”. There is no reason not to take this order at face value. Where an 
interlocutory injunction has been in place for an inordinate amount of time, it is 
always open to a party to apply to have it varied or vacated. Google has brought no 
such application. 
[52] Datalink and its representatives have ignored all previous court orders 
made against them, have left British Columbia, and continue to operate their business 
from unknown locations outside Canada. Equustek has made efforts to locate 
Datalink with limited success. Datalink is only able to survive — at the expense of 
Equustek’s survival — on Google’s search engine which directs potential customers 
to its websites. In other words, Google is how Datalink has been able to continue 
harming Equustek in defiance of several court orders.  
[53] This does not make Google liable for this harm. It does, however, make 
Google the determinative player in allowing the harm to occur. On balance, therefore, 
since the interlocutory injunction is the only effective way to mitigate the harm to 
Equustek pending the resolution of the underlying litigation, the only way, in fact, to 
preserve Equustek itself pending the resolution of the underlying litigation, and since 
any countervailing harm to Google is minimal to non-existent, the interlocutory 
injunction should be upheld.  
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[54] I would dismiss the appeal with costs in this Court and in the Court of 
Appeal for British Columbia. 
 
The following are the reasons delivered by 
 
 CÔTÉ AND ROWE JJ. —  
[55] Equustek Solutions Inc., Robert Angus and Clarma Enterprises Inc. 
(“Equustek”) seek a novel form of equitable relief ― an effectively permanent 
injunction, against an innocent third party, that requires court supervision, has not 
been shown to be effective, and for which alternative remedies are available. Our 
response calls for judicial restraint. While the court had jurisdiction to issue the June 
13, 2014 order against Google Inc. (“Google Order”) (2014 BCSC 1063, 374 D.L.R. 
(4th) 537, per Fenlon J.), in our view it should have refrained from doing so. The 
authority to grant equitable remedies has always been constrained by doctrine and 
practice. In our view, the Google Order slipped too easily from these constraints. 
[56] As we will explain, the Google Order is effectively final redress against a 
non-party that has neither acted unlawfully, nor aided and abetted illegal action. The 
test for interlocutory injunctions established in RJR ― MacDonald Inc. v. Canada 
(Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, does not apply to an order that is effectively 
final, and the test for a permanent injunction has not been satisfied. The Google Order 
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is mandatory and requires court supervision. It has not been shown to be effective, 
and there are alternative remedies available to Equustek.  
I. Judicial Restraint 
[57] The power of a court to grant injunctive relief is derived from that of the 
Chancery courts of England (Fourie v. Le Roux, [2007] UKHL 1, [2007] 1 All E.R. 
1087, at para. 30), and has been confirmed in British Columbia by the Law and 
Equity Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 253, s. 39(1): 
39 (1) An injunction or an order in the nature of mandamus may be 
granted or a receiver or receiver manager appointed by an 
interlocutory order of the court in all cases in which it appears to the 
court to be just or convenient that the order should be made. 
[58] In Fourie, Lord Scott explained that “provided the court has in personam 
jurisdiction over the person against whom an injunction, whether interlocutory or 
final, is sought, the court has jurisdiction, in the strict sense, to grant it” (para. 30). 
However, simply because a court has the jurisdiction to grant an injunction does not 
mean that it should. A court “will not according to its settled practice do so except in 
a certain way and under certain circumstances” (Lord Scott, at para. 25, quoting from 
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Hannay & Co., [1915] 2 K.B. 536, at p. 563; see 
also Cartier International AG v. British Sky Broadcasting Ltd., 2014 EWHC 3354 
(Ch.), [2015] 1 All E.R. 949, at paras. 98-100). Professor Spry comes to similar 
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conclusions (I. C. F. Spry, The Principles of Equitable Remedies (9th ed. 2014), at p. 
333): 
The powers of courts with equitable jurisdiction to grant injunctions 
are, subject to any relevant statutory restrictions, unlimited. Injunctions 
are granted only when to do so accords with equitable principles, but this 
restriction involves, not a defect of powers, but an adoption of doctrines 
and practices that change in their application from time to time. [Footnote 
omitted.] 
[59] The importance of appropriately modifying judicial restraint to meet the 
needs of justice was summarized by Lord Nicholls in Mercedes Benz A.G. v. Leiduck , 
[1996] 1 A.C. 284 (P.C.), at p. 308: “As circumstances in the world change, so must 
the situations in which the courts may properly exercise their jurisdiction to grant 
injunctions. The exercise of the jurisdiction must be principled, but the criterion is 
injustice.” 
[60] Changes to “settled practice” must not overshoot the mark of avoiding 
injustice. In our view, granting the Google Order requires changes to settled practice 
that are not warranted in this case: neither the test for an interlocutory nor a 
permanent injunction has been met; court supervision is required; the order has not 
been shown to be effective; and alternative remedies are available. 
II. Factors Suggesting Restraint in This Case 
A. The Effects of the Google Order Are Final 
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[61] In RJR ― MacDonald, this Court set out the test for interlocutory 
injunctions ― a serious question to be tried, irreparable harm, and the balance of 
convenience ― but also described an exception (at pp. 338-39): 
Two exceptions apply to the general rule that a judge should not 
engage in an extensive review of the merits. The first arises when the 
result of the interlocutory motion will in effect amount to a final 
determination of the action. This will be the case either when the right 
which the applicant seeks to protect can only be exercised immediately or 
not at all, or when the result of the application will impose such hardship 
on one party as to remove any potential benefit from proceeding to trial. 
 
. . . 
 
The circumstances in which this exception will apply are rare. When it 
does, a more extensive review of the merits of the case must be 
undertaken. Then when the second and third stages of the test are 
considered and applied the anticipated result on the merits should be 
borne in mind. [Emphasis added.] 
[62] In our view, the Google Order “in effect amount[s] to a final 
determination of the action” because it “remove[s] any potential benefit from 
proceeding to trial”. In order to understand this conclusion, it is useful to review 
Equustek’s underlying claim. Equustek sought, in its Further Amended Notice of 
Civil Claim against Datalink, damages, declarations, and: 
A temporary and permanent injunction restraining the Defendants from: 
 
a. using the Plaintiffs’ trademarks and free-riding on the goodwill of 
any Equustek products on any website; 
 
b. making statements disparaging or in any way referring to the 
Equustek products; 
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c. distributing the offending manuals and displaying images of the 
Plaintiff’s products on any website; and 
 
d. selling the GW1000 line of products which were created by the theft 
of the Plaintiff’s trade secrets; 
 
and obliging them to: 
 
e. immediately disclose all hidden websites; 
 
f. display a page on all websites correcting [their] misrepresentations 
about the source and continuing availability of the Equustek 
products and directing customers to Equustek. 
In short, Equustek sought injunctions modifying the way in which Datalink carries 
out its website business, along with damages and declarations. On June 20, 2012, 
Datalink’s response was struck and Equustek was given leave to apply for default 
judgment. It has not done so. On December 13, 2012, Justice Tindale ordered that  
[t]he Defendants Morgan Jack, Datalink Technologies Gateways Inc. and 
Datalink Technologies Gateways LLC (the “Datalink Defendants”) cease 
operating or carrying on business through any website, including those 
contained in Schedule “A” and all associated pages, subpages and 
subdirectories, and that these Defendants immediately take down all such 
websites, until further order of this court. [“December 2012 Order”] 
The December 2012 Order gives Equustek more than the injunctive relief it sought in 
its originating claim. Rather than simply ordering the modification of Datalink 
websites, the December 2012 Order requires the ceasing of website business 
altogether. In our view, little incentive remains for Equustek to return to court to seek 
a lesser injunctive remedy. This is evidenced by Equustek’s choice to not seek default 
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judgment during the roughly five years which have passed since it was given leave to 
do so. 
[63] As for the Google Order, it provides Equustek with an additional remedy, 
beyond the December 2012 Order and beyond what was sought in its original claim. 
In our view, granting of the Google Order further erodes any remaining incentive for 
Equustek to proceed with the underlying action. The effects of the Google Order are 
final in nature. Respectfully, the pending litigation assumed by our colleague Abella 
J. is a fiction. The Google Order, while interlocutory in form, is final in effect. Thus, 
it gives Equustek more relief than it sought. 
[64] Procedurally, Equustek requested an interlocutory order in the course of 
its litigation with Datalink. While Equustek’s action against Datalink could 
technically endure indefinitely (G.P. Fraser, J.W. Horn and S.A. Griffin, The Conduct 
of Civil Litigation in British Columbia (2nd ed. (loose-leaf)), at § 14.1) ― and thus 
the interlocutory status of the injunction could technically endure indefinitely ― it 
does not follow that the Google Order should be considered interlocutory. Courts of 
equity look to substance over form, because “a dogged devotion to form has often 
resulted in injustice” (John Deere Ltd. v. Firdale Farms Ltd. (1987), 45 D.L.R. (4th) 
641 (Man. C.A.), at p. 645). In Parkin v. Thorold (1852), 16 Beav. 59, 51 E.R. 698, at 
p. 701, Lord Romilly explained it thus: 
. . . Courts of Equity make a distinction in all cases between that which is 
matter of substance and that which is matter of form; and, if [they do] 
find that by insisting on the form, the substance will be defeated, [they 
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hold] it to be inequitable to allow a person to insist on such form, and 
thereby defeat the substance. 
In our view, the substance of the Google Order amounts to a final remedy. As such, it 
provides Equustek with more equitable relief than it sought against Datalink, and 
amounts to final resolution via Google. It is, in effect, a permanent injunction. 
[65] Following RJR ― MacDonald (at pp. 338-39), an extensive review of the 
merits is therefore required at the first stage of the analysis (Schooff v. British 
Columbia (Medical Services Commission), 2010 BCCA 396, 323 D.L.R. (4th) 680, at 
paras. 26-27). Yet this was not done. When Justice Fenlon considered Equustek’s 
application for an interim injunction enjoining Google to cease indexing or 
referencing Datalink’s websites, she did not conduct an extensive review of the 
merits. She did however note that Equustek had raised an arguable case, and that 
Datalink was presumed to have admitted the allegations when its defenses were 
struck (para. 151). The rule is not immutable that if a statement of defense is struck, 
the defendant is deemed to have admitted the allegations contained in the statement of 
claim. While the facts relating to Datalink’s liability are deemed to be admitted, the 
court can still exercise its discretion in assessing Equustek’s claims (McIsaac v. 
Healthy Body Services Inc., 2009 BCSC 1716, at paras. 42 and 44 (CanLII); Plouffe 
v. Roy, 2007 CanLII 37693 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 53; Spiller v. Brown (1973), 43 
D.L.R. (3d) 140 (Alta. S.C. (App. Div.)), at p. 143). Equustek has avoided such an 
assessment. Thus, an extensive review of the merits was not carried out. 
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[66] The Google Order also does not meet the test for a permanent injunction.  
To obtain a permanent injunction, a party is required to establish: (1) its legal rights; 
(2) that damages are an inadequate remedy; and (3) that there is no impediment to the 
court’s discretion to grant an injunction (1711811 Ontario Ltd. v. Buckley Insurance 
Brokers Ltd., 2014 ONCA 125, 371 D.L.R. (4th) 643, at paras. 74-80; Spry, at pp. 
395 and 407-8). Equustek has shown the inadequacy of damages (damages are 
ascertainable but unlikely to be recovered, and the wrong is continuing). However, in 
our view, it is unclear whether the first element of the test has been met. Equustek’s 
claims were supported by a good prima facie case, but it was not established that 
Datalink designed and sold counterfeit versions of its product, or that this resulted in 
trademark infringement and unlawful appropriation of trade secrets. 
[67] In any case, the discretionary factors affecting the grant of an injunction 
strongly favour judicial restraint. As we will outline below, the Google Order enjoins 
a non-party, yet Google has not aided or abetted Datalink’s wrongdoing; it holds no 
assets of Equustek’s, and has no information relevant to the underlying proceedings. 
The Google Order is mandatory and requires court supervision. It has not been shown 
to be effective, and Equustek has alternative remedies. 
B. Google Is a Non-Party 
[68] A court order does not “technically” bind non-parties, but “anyone who 
disobeys the order or interferes with its purpose may be found to have obstructed the 
course of justice and hence be found guilty of contempt of court” (MacMillan Bloedel 
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Ltd. v. Simpson, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 1048, at paras. 23 and 27). In MacMillan Bloedel, 
the injunction prohibiting named individuals from blocking a logging road also 
caused non-parties to face contempt proceedings for doing the act prohibited by the 
injunction. 
[69] The instant case is not one where a non-party with knowledge of a court 
order deliberately disobeyed it and thereby deprecated the court’s authority. Google 
did not carry out the act prohibited by the December 2012 Order. The act prohibited 
by the December 2012 Order is Datalink “carrying on business through any website”. 
That act occurs whenever Datalink launches websites to carry out business ― not 
when other parties, such as Google, make it known that such websites exist. 
[70] There is no doubt that non-parties also risk contempt proceedings by 
aiding and abetting the doing of a prohibited act (Seaward v. Paterson, [1897] 1 Ch. 
545 (C.A.); D. Bean, A. Burns and I. Parry, Injunctions (11th ed. 2012), at para. 9-
08). Lord Denning said in Acrow (Automation) Ltd. v. Rex Chainbelt Inc., [1971] 1 
W.L.R. 1676 (C.A.), at p. 1682: 
It has long been held that the court has jurisdiction to commit for 
contempt a person, not a party to the action, who, knowing of an 
injunction, aids and abets the defendant in breaking it. The reason is that 
by aiding and abetting the defendant, he is obstructing the course of 
justice. 
[71] In our view, Google did not aid or abet the doing of the prohibited act. 
Equustek alleged that Google’s search engine was facilitating Datalink’s ongoing 
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breach by leading customers to Datalink websites (Fenlon J.’s reasons, at para. 10). 
However, the December 2012 Order was to cease carrying on business through any 
website. That Order was breached as soon as Datalink established a website to 
conduct its business, regardless of how visible that website might be through Google 
searches. If Equustek’s argument were accepted, the scope of “aids and abets” would, 
in our view, become overbroad. It might include the companies supplying Datalink 
with the material to produce the derivative products, the companies delivering the 
products, or as Google argued in its factum, it might also include the local power 
company that delivers power to Datalink’s physical address. Critically, Datalink 
breached the December 2012 Order simply by launching websites to carry out 
business, regardless of whether Google searches ever reveal the websites. 
[72] We agree with our colleague Justice Abella that Mareva injunctions and 
Norwich orders can operate against non-parties. However, we respectfully disagree 
that the Google Order is similar in nature to those remedies. Mareva injunctions are 
granted to freeze assets until the completion of a trial ― they do not enforce a 
plaintiff’s substantive rights (Mercedes Benz, at p. 302). In contrast, the Google Order 
enforces Equustek’s asserted intellectual property rights by seeking to minimize harm 
to those rights. It does not freeze Datalink’s assets (and, in fact, may erode those 
assets). 
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[73] Norwich orders are made to compel information from third parties. In 
Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Customs and Excise Commissioners, [1974] A.C. 133 
(H.L.), at p. 175, Lord Reid identified 
a very reasonable principle that if through no fault of his own a person 
gets mixed up in the tortious acts of others so as to facilitate their wrong-
doing he may incur no personal liability but he comes under a duty to 
assist the person who has been wronged by giving him full information 
and disclosing the identity of the wrongdoers. 
Lord Reid found that “without certain action on [Customs’] part the infringements 
could never have been committed” (at 174). In spite of this finding, the court did not 
require Customs to take specific action to prevent importers from infringing the 
patent of Norwich Pharmacal; rather the court issued a limited order compelling 
Customs to disclose the names of importers. In Cartier, the court analogized from 
Norwich to support an injunction requiring Internet service providers (“ISPs”) to 
block access to trademark-infringing websites because “it is via the ISPs’ services” 
that customers view and purchase the infringing material (para. 155). That injunction 
did not extend to parties merely assisting in finding the websites. 
[74] In the case at bar, we are of the view that Google does not play a role in 
Datalink’s breach of the December 2012 Order. Whether or not the December 2012 
Order is violated does not hinge on the degree of success of the prohibited website 
business. Rather, the December 2012 Order is violated merely by Datalink 
conducting business through a website, regardless of the visibility of that website or 
the number of customers that visit the website. Thus Google does not play a role 
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analogous to Customs in Norwich nor the ISPs in Cartier. And unlike the order in 
Norwich, the Google Order compels positive action aimed at the illegal activity rather 
than simply requiring the provision of information to the court. 
C. The Google Order Is Mandatory 
[75] While the distinction between mandatory and prohibitive injunctions has 
been questioned (see National Commercial Bank of Jamaica Ltd. v. Olint Corp., 
[2009] 1 W.L.R. 1405 (P.C.), at para. 20), courts have rightly, in our view, proceeded 
cautiously where an injunction requires the defendant to incur additional expenses to 
take positive steps (Redland Bricks Ltd. v. Morris, [1970] A.C. 652 (H.L.), at 
pp. 665-66; J. Berryman, The Law of Equitable Remedies (2nd ed. 2013), at pp. 199-
200). Also relevant to the decision of whether to grant a mandatory injunction is 
whether it might require continued supervision by the courts, especially where the 
terms of the order cannot be precisely drawn and where it may result in wasteful 
litigation over compliance (Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. v. Argyll Stores 
(Holdings) Ltd., [1998] A.C. 1 (H.L.). 
[76] The Google Order requires ongoing modification and supervision 
because Datalink is launching new websites to replace de-listed ones. In fact, the 
Google Order has been amended at least seven times to capture Datalink’s new sites 
(orders dated November 27, 2014; April 22, 2015; June 4, 2015; July 3, 2015; 
September 15, 2015; January 12, 2016 and March 30, 2016). In our view, courts 
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should avoid granting injunctions that require such cumbersome court-supervised 
updating. 
D. The Google Order Has Not Been Shown To Be Effective 
[77] A court may decline to grant an injunction on the basis that it would be 
futile or ineffective in achieving the purpose for which it is sought (Spry, at pp. 
419-20; Berryman, at p. 113). For example, in Attorney General v. Observer Ltd., 
[1990] 1 A.C. 109 (H.L.), the Spycatcher memoirs of an M.I.5 agent were already 
readily available, thus making a perpetual injunction against publication by the 
defendant newspapers ineffective.  
[78] In our view, the Google Order is not effective in enforcing the December 
2012 Order. It is recalled that the December 2012 Order requires that Datalink “cease 
operating or carrying on business through any website” — it says nothing about the 
visibility or success of the website business. The December 2012 Order is violated as 
soon as Datalink launches websites to carry on business, regardless of whether those 
websites appear in a Google search. Moreover, the Google Order does not assist 
Equustek in modifying the Datalink websites, as Equustek sought in its originating 
claim for injunctive relief. 
[79] The most that can be said is that the Google Order might reduce the harm 
to Equustek which Fenlon J. found “Google is inadvertently facilitating” (para. 152). 
But it has not been shown that the Google Order is effective in doing so. As Google 
Case 5:17-cv-04207   Document 1   Filed 07/24/17   Page 139 of 143
  
points out, Datalink’s websites can be found using other search engines, links from 
other sites, bookmarks, email, social media, printed material, word-of-mouth, or other 
indirect means. Datalink’s websites are open for business on the Internet whether 
Google searches list them or not. In our view, this lack of effectiveness suggests 
restraint in granting the Google Order. 
[80] Moreover, the quest for elusive effectiveness led to the Google Order 
having worldwide effect. This effect should be taken into consideration as a factor in 
exercising discretion. Spry explains that territorial limitations to equitable jurisdiction 
are “to some extent determined by reference to questions of effectiveness and of 
comity” (p. 37). While the worldwide effect of the Google Order does not make it 
more effective, it could raise concerns regarding comity. 
E. Alternatives Are Available 
[81] Highlighting the lack of effectiveness are the alternatives available to 
Equustek. An equitable remedy is not required unless there is no other appropriate 
remedy at law (Spry, at pp. 402-3). In our view, Equustek has an alternative remedy 
in law. Datalink has assets in France. Equustek sought a world-wide Mareva 
injunction to freeze those assets, but the Court of Appeal for British Columbia urged 
Equustek to pursue a remedy in French courts: “At present, it appears that the 
proposed defendants reside in France . . . . The information before the Court is that 
French courts will assume jurisdiction and entertain an application to freeze the assets 
in that country” (2016 BCCA 190, 88 B.C.L.R. (5th) 168, at para. 24). We see no 
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reason why Equustek cannot do what the Court of Appeal urged it to do. Equustek 
could also pursue injunctive relief against the ISPs, as was done in Cartier, in order to 
enforce the December 2012 Order. In addition, Equustek could initiate contempt 
proceedings in France or in any other jurisdiction with a link to the illegal websites. 
III. Conclusion 
[82] For these reasons, we are of the view that the Google Order ought not to 
have been granted. We would allow the appeal and set aside the June 13, 2014 order 
of the Supreme Court of British Columbia. 
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